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This thesis is about identity clashes during the first two years of the Syrian uprising (from 15th of 
March 2011 to 15th of March 2013). Chiefly, it attempts to answer the following questions: what 
roles do identities play in the construction of power among the various identity groups? What were 
the reasons for the identity clashes that occurred during the Syrian uprising?. How can we evaluate 
the reproduction of identity during the uprising?. The Alawite, Sunni, Kurdish and Syrian national 
identities are used to illustrate how in the course of the uprising, these identities were consistently 
being reproduced as each group vied for power. This thesis argues that during the Syrian uprising 
these identities were subject to an enduring process of reproduction and reinforcement by discourse 
directed from above and from below, in which symbolic and materialistic elements played a vital 
role.  The mode of analysis for this thesis is framed by the modernist and symbolist approaches to 





















Chapter One: Scope of the Study 
  
The following account provides an overview of the content and the methodology of the thesis. It 
consists of five sections. Subsequent to the introduction, the first section outlines the research 
questions and justifies the selection of the case studies. The second section surveys the theoretical 
literature and discusses the theoretical model for the thesis. The third section delineates the main 
argument of the thesis in accordance with its hypotheses. The fourth section discusses the 
methodological approach, research sources, limitations of the research, and the definition of terms. 
The fifth section provides an outline of the structure of the thesis.  
Introduction 
For forty-two years, questions surrounding identity and sectarianism in Syria had been excluded 
from the public debate. Unlike their neighbors in Lebanon and Iraq, Syrians appeared to be 





national identity.  When asked about his or her sectarian identity, a Syrian would typically give 
the instant reply, al-dyn li Allah w al-watan li al-jamy’, meaning that religion is for God and the 
country is for all. For Syrians, discussing sectarian identities was ’aib a shame as it was their 
belief that kuluna souryoun we are all Syrians. They seemed to have a sense of pride in their 
national identity and were prioritising it over sectarian affiliations. In this context, a Syrian 
Alawite man filmed the first protest against the Syrian president Bashar Assad’s rule in the heart 
of Damascus on March 2011. Whilst filming protesters chanting freedom slogans, this Alawite 
man seemed to be extremely confident about the extent to which Syrians were united in their 
national identity, stressing that “all factions of the Syrian people are united [...] Sunnis and 
Alawites will cooperate together to overthrow this regime”.1 Realistically, his words proved to be 
highly idealistic in comparison to what happened on the ground.  Although the Syrian uprising 
had its roots in a peaceful movement that strove for social justice it nevertheless morphed into an 
armed power struggle between various groups, in which sectarian identities were 
instrumentalised. At the time of writing, a fight for hegemony between the Sunni, Alawite, 
Kurdish and Syrian national identities is taking place. What went wrong? Why did Syrians, who 
once seemed to possess a cohesive unity, become fragmented in a civil war? What accounts for 
this fight and how we can evaluate it? This thesis attempts to answer these questions. 
However, it must be emphasised that the aim of this thesis is not to simplify the uprising of the 
Syrian people by characterising it as a war of identities. Rather, it defines this war of identities as 
being one of the core dimensions of the uprising. 
 
1.1Questions and objectives of the research: 
The ultimate object of this thesis is to address the causes of the identity clashes during the Syrian 
uprising and to evaluate the reproduction of identities during its first two years (March 2011 to 
March 2013). To this end, the thesis evaluates endeavors of state and non-state political 
                                                          
1Author’s interview with anonymous Alawite via Skype 15/3/2011. Also, the video of this protest is available online 
and sources who were presented at the protest assured the author of the accuracy of this material. See “al-thawra al-






entrepreneurs to construct identities and assesses their roles in reproducing Sunni, Alawite, 
Kurdish and Syrian national identities. ‘Syrian national identity’ represents the identification with 
the Syrian state (al hawiyya al-wataniyya) as opposed to sectarian identity (al-hawiyya al-
ta’ifiyya). The Arabic word ta’ifiyya stems from tai’fa which refers to sect, group, clan, class, and 
ethnicity. Hence it is a reliable signifier of group identity.2 This thesis also examines the role of 
materialistic elements (e.g. arms and media), and symbolic features (e.g. flag, folklore and 
language) in reproducing identities and reinforcing the strength of a given identity over the others. 
As stated above, the primary aim of this thesis is to account for identity clashes during the Syrian 
uprising. However answering this question requires an examination of the following questions: 
 
1) What role does identity play in establishing power among the various groups? 
2) How can we assess the reproduction of identities during the uprising? 
3) What are the roles that state and non-state political entrepreneurs play in shaping identities? 
4) How can we evaluate the impact of the material structure and the symbolic elements on 
identities? 
5) What are the implications of communal violence on identity clashes? 
 
 
1.2 Case selection: 
This thesis opted for Sunnis, Alawites and Kurds as the categories that best represent key identities 
in Syria. The Alawites constitute a religious minority group that has been in power for 
approximately four decades, and is the largest religious minority in Syria. During the uprising, the 
Alawites engaged in a vicious conflict with Sunnis. The Sunnis constitute a religious majority 
group who had a historical record of clashes with the Alawites in late 1970s and early 1980s and 
                                                          
2  Anh Nga Longva and Anne Sofie Roald Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, Self-Empowerment, 







who strove to control the Alawites during the Syrian uprising. The Kurds constitute the largest 
ethnic minority group in Syria who, prior to the uprising, were largely oppressed by Syrian 
authorities. During the uprising, they established a quasi-autonomy in which identity clashes took 
place. Additionally, this thesis examines the Syrian national identity as a mean of illustrating how 
amid the identity clashes, this identity was being continually reproduced while it strove for 




2.1. Theoretical literature and paradigms towards analysing identity clashes: 
The use of a single theoretical approach to the study of identity clashes would limit the scope of 
the thesis by only revealing one part of the greater picture. Thus, this thesis attempts to encapsulate 
various theories in an analytical model that serves as a tool with which to answer the research 
questions. This model is not inherently biased toward any existing theory, which makes it ideally 
suited to addressing the lacunas in some theories concerning the question of identity. The following 
section provides a theoretical literature review, which both specifies these theories and justifies 
the reasons for deploying them. In addition, it illustrates how these theories function together when 
are combined. 
2.1.1 – Theories of Identity, Nationalism and Constructivism: 
 
Conceptualising identity: 
What about identity? I asked. 
He said: It is self-defense. 
Identity is the child of birth, but in the end of the day, it is self-invention.3 
                                                          






The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwysh (d. 2008) 
Identity is an extremely paradoxical concept that is not subject to a fixed definition.  It may be a 
source of stability and of instability, of violence or of tolerance, it may be a motivation for unity 
and for division. Idem is the Latin root of the word identity, and it translates to English as “the 
same”.4  Despite the fact that identity is an elusive concept that is not subject to a particular 
definition, it can be argued that, its core meaning lies in how it denotes the actor’s relationship to 
the other, since it is “shaped and modified by interaction between the individual and the 
surrounding social milieu”.5 Telhami and Barnet (2002) note that identities are not “only personal 
or psychological, but are also social and are profoundly influenced by the actor’s interaction with 
and relationship to the other”.6 In light of this, theorists of the two main schools of identity studies, 
(the social identity and the identity theory), agree that identity is based on how an individual is 
differs in his or her relationship with the other.7 Bernard Lewis (1998) argues that identity “is the 
line that divides self from other, insiders from outsiders, a clear division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
”.8 In parallel to this, Johan R. Campbell and Alan Rew (1999) stress that “identity concerns what 
you consider yourself to belong to both at the level of ideas and explanation but also in terms of 
emotional experience and the expression of affect”.9 They went on to argue that all types of 
identities are based on perspectives of  otherness and that “all social identities racial, ethnic, 
gendered, sexual, religious and national- find their definition in relation to significant others just 
                                                          
4 Gleason, Philip “Identifying identity; a semantic history”,  Journal of American History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (March 
1983), pp.910-031, p.911. 
5 Ibid,p.918. For detailed account on definitions of identity see Charles Lemert “A history of Identity; the riddle at 
the heart of the mystery of life”, in Anthony Elliott Routledge Handbook of Identity studies, (London: Routledge, 
2011) pp.3-29 . 
6Shibley Telhami and Michel Barnet  Identity and foreign policy in the Middle East, (London: Cronell University 
Press, 2002), p.8  
7 Social identity theory, which is applied to this thesis, emphasises category-based identity and identity theory 
focuses on role-based identity. See Jan, Stests and Burke, Peter “Identity theory and social identity theory” social 
psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2000 pp. 224-237,p.224. For an  analytical  discussion on identity theory and 
identity social theory see Stryker, Sheldon and Burke Peter “The Past, and Future of Identity Theory” social 
psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Dec. 2000),pp.284-297 
8 Bernard Lewis  The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, (New York: Schocken Books, 1998),p.111 






as they articulate ideas of selfhood which are communicated and giving meaning through social 
interaction”.10 
But what is an identity composed of? Identity entails a group of affiliations that an individual has 
with a place, state, religion, tribe or a clan. It cannot be limited to one given affiliation. Rather, it 
is composed of myriad affiliations which can be considered as layers of identity. None of these 
layers are capable of completely eroding or effacing the others, however, one given layer may 
prevail over the others.11 Although these layers “can be integrated in a relatively harmonious 
way”12 and can function together peacefully, they nevertheless may contradict each other and 
consequently provoke identity clashes.13  Thus, identities are not stable, but are subject to radical 
change. Indeed, there is a myriad of environmental factors that are capable of disturbing the 
balance of identity and inciting clashes.  Ostensibly, the most significant factor is the politicisation 
of identity by state or non-state political entrepreneurs who manipulate identities for their own 
ends. In this light, Caroline Brettell (2003) argues that political entrepreneurs “work for the profit 
gained by identifying themselves with ethnic pride or ethnic issue”.14 Various elements accelerate 
this process of politicisation, such as socio-economic factors and the symbolic features that are 
most likely to turn the identity into a primary source of instability and violence. In short as the 
prominent Lebanese author Amin Ma’llouf puts it, the politicisation of identity can transform 
identity into wahish a monster.15 
Paradigms of Nationalism, Identity and Ethnicity; 
In essence, the central debate among theorists of nationalism, identity and ethnicity concerns the 
role of the past in shaping these three concepts. The role of the past has divided theorists and 
prompted them to follow different approaches. The dominant debate exists between the 
                                                          
10Ibid.p.13.  
11David Miller On Nationality (oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.120-121.  
12Telhami and Barnet, op.cit., p.15 
13Stryker,op.cit., p.290. 
 
14 Caroline Brettell, Anthropology and Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity, (Lanham: 
Alta Mira Press, 2003),p.127 
15Amin Ma’llouf  al-hawiyyat al-katela, (The Killing Identities),( Syria; Dal al Hassad, 1999),p.10. Also see 
Amartya Sen al- hawyyia w al-’unf; wahem al-qadar (Identity and violence; the illusion of destiny), ( Lebanon: 





primordialists and the modernists, instrumentalists and constructivists. Primordialism assumes that 
identity is ancient, hereditary and fixed from birth, as it is grounded on ‘primordial’ attachments 
to a particular group or culture. For primordialists individuals are born into an identity rather than 
consciously or voluntarily adhering to one.16 Modernists stress that nationalism is a product of 
modernity, and that it “came into being with the transition to industrialism”. 17  Meanwhile, 
instrumentalists consider identities, nationalism and ethnicity as mere tools of the state or non-
state political entrepreneurs who seek to achieve their own materialistic objectives.18 Similarly, 
the constructivist approach assumes that nationalism, ethnicity and identities are open to 
manipulation by political leaders while admitting that identities stem from historical roots. In short, 
constructivists claim that identity has its roots in the past but that this past is nevertheless subject 
to human actions and the manipulation of political entrepreneurs in their struggle for power. 
However, constructivists also assert that identities cannot be manipulated to the point at which 
new or artificial identities are easily invented.19 
Seen in this vein, Ernest Gellner argues that nationalism is a product of modernity and that, before 
the advent of modernity, it did not exist. He asserts that it was only under the impact of a “certain 
kind of socio-economic form, best described as ‘industrialism’ […] nation emerged and become 
politically significant and often engendered changes in boundaries”.20 For modernists like Gellner 
it was only the modern era that provided the material sources to create nationalism (e.g. 
transportation and educational system and print). In this light, the age of globalisation and 
technology revolution provided the state or non-state actors with new materials for reconstructing 
identity, such as Satellite TV stations, digital media, internet and social networks. All of these 
materials are now considered to be major tools in the “struggle over the construction of social and 
political reality”.21 Furthermore, the rapid and wide diffusion of digital media and internet based 
social media is no longer limited to developed countries, and these tools are being widely used by 
                                                          
16 Umut Ozkirmli Theories of Nationalism; A critical introduction, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.49.   
17 Ernest Gellner Nations and nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) xxiii 
18 Calhoun op.cit, p. 30.  For a comprehensive  account on instrumentalist approach see Paul Brass “Elite groups, 
symbol manipulation and ethnic identity and the Muslim of South Asia”, in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp 
Political Identity in South Asia,( London; Curzon Press, 1979), pp.85-105 
19 Calhoun op.cit,, p.30.  
20 Ernest Gellner Encounters Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher Ltd, 1994), p.199.  






people in the third world. Consequently, this has eroded the states’ monopoly on media.22 Indeed, 
during the last decade a vast amount of literature has emerged that focuses on the impact of new 
media on political and socio-economic spheres in the Arab World.  Most scholars admit that the 
internet is an extremely powerful tool which is “embedded in actual societal structures and power 
dynamics: its topography weaves in and out of non-electronic space”.23 In fact, scholars argue that 
the new media implements are capable of empowering trans-sate identities  while weakening state 
identity.24 As this thesis illustrates, satellite TV stations and internet based social media like 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have a powerful impact on the formation, reconstruction and 
reinforcement of identity. During the Syrian uprising these uncontrolled materials were employed 
by political entrepreneurs to advance a particular form of manufactured identity. 
 
Symbols and myths vis-à-vis sub-state identities: 
The modernist logic places a heavy emphasis on the role of materialistic elements like economy 
and mass media at the cost of neglecting the role of symbols in constructing identities. In light of 
this neglect, Anthony Smith, a former student of Gellner attempts to address the gaps in modernist 
theory by arguing that nationalism and identity draw on the history, symbols and culture of a 
particular group.  Smith developed the ‘ethno-symbolist’ approach to the study of nationalism, in 
which he looks at identities in terms of their “constituent symbolic resources, that is, memories, 
values, myths”.25 In this vein Murray Edelman defines myth as the “belief held in common by a 
large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning”.26 According to Stuart 
Kaufman, a symbol is an “emotionally charged shorthand reference to a myth”. 27  Ethno-
                                                          
22For a discussion of the media’s role during the Syrian uprising see Adam Almqvist “The Syrian Uprising and the 
transnational Public Sphere: New Media, Politics of Representation, and the Consolidation and Fragmentation of 
Publics”; (paper submitted to Center for Middle Eastern Studies: Lund University, 2013) 
23Sadkia Sassen, “Digital networks and power” in Mike Featherstone & Scott Lash (eds.) Spaces of Culture; City, 
Nation, World (London:Sage,1999), pp. 49-63. p.62 
24 For a further elaboration on the impact of media on civil society in Syria see Shaery-Eisenlohra, Roschanack 
“From Subject to Citizen? Civil Society and the Internet in Syria”, Middle East Critique, Vol. 20, Issue. 2,(2011) pp. 
127-138.  
25 Anthony Smith ethno-symbolism and nationalism; A cultural approach, (London: Routledge, 2009), p.15-16 
26Murray Edelman Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence, (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 
p. 14.  






symbolism mainly highlights the significance of symbols in forming identities and motivating 
communal actions, while modernism stresses the importance of the roles of material structures and 
the elite in the formation of nationalism and identity. Although Smith does not devalue these 
material factors, it is his belief that symbolism plays the most significant role in creating identities. 
In other words, Smith believes that symbols of mutual memories, myths, and values among 
members of a community establish cohesion. He asserts that the process of selecting symbols that 
represent the whole community and distinguish it from the ‘other’ is vital to the production and 
reproduction of identities.28  Similarly, Stuart Kaufman (2001) propounds the ‘symbolic politics 
theory’ of ethnic war, in which he stresses that symbols are the primary causes of ethnic wars. 
According to this theory “the core of ethnic identity is the ‘myth-symbol complex’ the combination 
of myths, memories, values, and symbols serves not only to determine who is a member of the 
group, but also to define what it means to be a member”.29 Kaufman maintains that “it is the 
existence, status, and security of the group symbols, which is why people are willing to fight and 
die for them-and why they are willing to follow leaders who manipulate those symbols for dubious 
or selfish purpose”.30 In Modern hatreds: the symbolic politics of ethnic war, Kaufman applies his 
theory to four cases in post-communist Europe in order to assess the role of symbols in provoking 
violence. He argues that members of the elite instrumentalise symbols of particular myths as a 
means of mobilising ethnic groups. In his words, ethnic symbols are “tools used by manipulative 
elites, but they only work when there is some real or perceived conflict of interest at work and 
mythically based feelings of hostility that can be tapped using ethnic symbols”.31  Mainly, he 
refutes the idea that ‘ancient hatreds’ are a chief source of ethnic violence, arguing that although 
hatred is ‘real’ and is an essential cause of ethnic conflict, it is not ancient. Rather, it is “renewed 
in each generation by mythologies that are typically modern revisions of older stories with quiet 
different messages”.32 This thesis applies Kaufman’s theory to its assessment of the roles of 
                                                          
28 Anthony Smith 2009, op.cit. 
 
29Stuart Kaufman 2001, op.cit., p.25. 
30 ibid 
31Stuart Kaufman, op. cit., p.12.  Also see Kaufman, Stuart “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The 
Palestinian-Israeli Case”, Security Studies 18, no.3 (September 2009), pp.400-434. 





symbols and myths in reproducing identities and its evaluation of their roles in provoking identity 
clashes during the Syrian uprising.  Although Kaufman’s contribution to the study of ethnic 
conflicts is distinguished and his approach is robust, he limits his focus to the elites’ roles in 
utilising symbols as hegemonic tools. In doing so, he downplays the role of the masses in 
reinforcing these symbols from below. Hence, this thesis attempts to bridge the gap in his theory 
by analysing the role of symbols in reproducing identities both at the grassroots level (bottom-up) 
and the elite level (top-down). 
Despite being the products of two very different schools of thought nevertheless, symbolist and 
modernist theories can function as analytical lenses through which one view the puzzle of identity.  
This thesis argues that materialistic and symbolic features are interdependent in their capacity to 
provoke identity clashes, both are used to equal effect in asserting the superiority of an identity 
against the ‘other’. 
 
The Constructivist approach: 
Constructivist logic characterises identities as fluid variables, and stresses that they are changeable 
according to their structure and to the manipulations of various actors. In other words, the 
constructivist approach assumes that identities are like paste, easily molded into different shapes 
by political entrepreneurs and influenced by myriad of factors. Moreover, constructivist theories 
assert that identity has the crucial ability to reshape social and political structure.33 This thesis 
favours a constructivist approach in assessing how identities were reconstructed during the 
uprising, and the extent to which the outbreak of identity clashes was caused by the alignment of 
internal factors. The policies of the Syrian regime and the sectarian discourse by a number of Sunni 
political entrepreneurs are two notable examples of these factors. The influence of external factors, 
such as rhetoric employed by outsider actors in relation to the uprising, is also considered here. 
The constructivist approach also accounts for how particular identities are reproduced and 
reinforced via symbolic elements. Most importantly, it focuses on the interaction between the 
various discourses, which occurs between material and ideational on one hand, and between 
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individual actors or groups on the other hand. In fact, the analysis of this kind of interaction is 
extremely important, as it either creates enmity or produces amity. By contrast, the ethno-
symbolism approach focuses mainly on the roles of symbols while ignoring the implications of 
these roles when they begin to interact with the surrounding actors and factors. In this respect, 
conducting a constructivist approach is more successful in bridging the gaps between theories of 
nationalism and ethnicity. In short, this thesis employs constructivist logic to evaluate the vertical 
and the horizontal reconstruction of Sunni, Alawite, Kurdish identities and the Syrian national 
identity, and the creation of identity clashes from above and from below.  Most importantly, this 
thesis uses constructivism as a lens through which to examine the interaction between discourses 
directed from above and  from below, and how this interaction produces the required circumstances 




2.1.2. Security dilemma and the fall of the state: 
 
This thesis adhere to Stathis Kalyvas’s definition of the term ‘security dilemma’, which is that 
security dilemma “occur when a breakdown of order creates a situation in which individuals 
coordinating around focal points, ethnic identities, resort to preemptive violence […] because of 
security fear”.34 Consequently, a security dilemma force ethnic groups into a self-help situation 
where no neutral government or a third party is able to guarantee the security of each group.35 
Therefore, each group becomes trapped in a cycle of mistrust,36 in which each group attempts to 
prevail over the other and, despite the consequent activation of defensive and offensive strategies, 
no group reached a state of absolute security. 
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This definition of security dilemma provides a potential explanation for the identity clashes in 
Syria. During the uprising each identity group feared that the others might have dominated and 
hence each group strove to attain hegemony.  Moreover, the security dilemma is easily escalated 
by chaos, violence and war propaganda which ferments the process of identity conflict. 
 
Overall, none of the foregoing theoretical approaches is solely capable of explaining identity 
clashes in Syria. For this reason, this thesis attempts to merge a combination of these theories into 








2. 2.  A theoretical model towards the study of identity clashes: 
 
The model argues that during the Syrian uprising the Alawite, Sunni, Kurdish and Syrian national 
identities were subject to an enduring process of reproduction by discourse that was directed from 
above and from below. This process establishes the power of identity and provokes identity 
clashes. Four variables are central to this process:  1) – state or non-state political entrepreneurs, 
2) - material structures, 3) – symbols and 4) – the presence of a security dilemma. 
 
3. Main argument and hypotheses: 
The following list of hypotheses gives an indication of the circumstances required for an outbreak 
of identity clashes of the kind that occurred during the Syrian uprising: 
1) State and non-state political entrepreneurs seek to reproduce an identity that establishes their 







2) External state and non-state actors orchestrate identity clashes while seeking realpolitik gain. 
Hence, they play significant roles in reinforcing the superiority of a specific identity over the other 
while remaining outside the country. 
 
3) Materialistic and symbolic elements combine to empower a specific identity in opposition to the 
other, whilst state and non-state political entrepreneurs utilise materialistic and symbolic elements 
to reinforce identity. At this point, symbols operating horizontally at the grassroots level help to 
fuel the conflict. 
 
4) Discourse directed from above interacts with that directed from below, and catalyses the 
continuous reproduction of identities. The reaction produced by these reproduced identities is 
largely responsible for the outbreak of identity clashes. 
 
5) The existence of a security dilemma among the various identity groups accelerates the outbreak of 
identity clashes. 
 
This thesis argues that, as modernists indicate, materialistic structures deployed by state and non-
state political entrepreneurs played a vital role in reproducing identities and inciting identity 
clashes during the Syrian uprising. Notable examples of these structures are the media, economy 
and arms, which deeply influenced the reconstruction of Alawite, Sunni, Kurdish and the Syrian 
national identity from above. On the other hand, symbolic features that are associated with a 
particular identity (such as flags and folklore), underscore the line between the outsider and the 
insider, fuelling the conflict between identities. Although, these symbols are manipulated by state 
and non-state political entrepreneurs using a top-down approach, symbolic features also operate 
horizontally at the public level by reproducing a particular identity and exacerbating the conflict 
between one identity and another. This thesis argues that policies directed from above interact with 
discourse directed from below, this making identity clashes possible. In addition, the security 
dilemma (in which each group feels insecure) escalates identity conflict and influences the 






4. 1. Methodological approach: 
Based on the qualitative research method, this thesis employs a discourse analysis technique. The 
aim of qualitative research is to deliver a substantial argument based on a “cogent interpretation” 
of various relevant sources.37   Surely, researching the question of identity during the Syrian 
uprising is an extremely complicated task, which requires a suitable research method that explores 
all of the factors surrounding it.  Indeed, prior to the uprising, experts in Syria adopted different 
methodological approaches towards the study of identity. These approaches include the historical 
(Ma’oz 1972), 38  the anecdotal (Ghalioun 2012), 39  and the biographical (Seale 1988). 40 
Additionally, distinguished scholars like Raymond Hinnebusch (2011),41 and Nicolas Van Dam 
(2011), 42 applied a combined approach of discourse and content analysis. However, none of these 
valuable accounts placed their arguments within the nationalism and ethnicity debate. 
Nevertheless, inspired by the modernist approach, Christopher Phillips, 43  provides a notable 
volume as regards the daily reproduction of the Arab identity (as a supra-national identity) in Syria 
prior to the uprising. However, Phillips devalued the symbolic factors in reproducing identity and 
furthermore, neglected the ‘everyday’ reproduction of sub-state identities which challenged the 
‘everyday reproduction of Arab identity’, and which eventually triggered identity clashes.    
In parallel, one year after the uprising some volumes emerged that discussed the dimensions of the 
uprising, but which lacked any theoretical framework as most authors adopted journalistic or 
narrative approaches.  For instance, the Irish journalist Stephen Starr (2012), 44  provides an 
insightful volume in which he examines the implications of the sectarian divisions during the 
uprising without framing his argument in a theoretical perspective. Likewise, in The Syrian 
Rebellion,45 the Middle East expert Fouad Ajami uses a narrative approach to analyse the sectarian 
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affiliations. Although Ajami’s volume is rich in terms of empirical work and background, it is 
limited to a narrative use of rhetoric and hence neglects to provide any theoretical grounding. On 
the other hand, Carsten Wieland (2012),46 provides a detailed account in which he applies content 
and discourse analysis to evaluate the Syrian regime’s ‘lost chances’, which would have hindered 
the explosion of sectarian conflict. However, Wieland’s volume does not focus on identity clashes 
per se. 
All of these methods have provided valuable contributions to the study of identities in Syria prior 
to and during the uprising. Specifically, however, this thesis applies discourse analysis method that 
is grounded in the nationalism and ethnicity debate and which is framed by constructivist theory. 
Discourse analysis is the main approach favoured by constructivists, as for them it is the interaction 
between discourses that creates a particular reality. Hence in order to study a specific reality one 
should analyse the discourse of all actors involved. Most importantly, one should study the 
interaction between these discourses and map the implications of such an interaction.  Discourse 
analysis has been applied to various disciplines, such as anthropology, international relations, 
culture studies and psychology. Notably, this methodology is not limited to linguistic studies, but 
instead focuses mainly on the dialogue and relations between speech, language, interests, 
knowledge and actions amongst all actors in a given social context.47 In relation to this thesis, a 
discourse analysis methodology appropriately addresses the research questions by engaging in an 
in depth of all actors involved. Furthermore, this methodology analyse the interaction between 
these actors, such as the policies, actions and rhetoric employed by state and non-state political 
entrepreneurs.  Lastly, in its adoption of such methodology, this thesis aims to bridge the gaps left 
in the existing literature and to contribute to a deeper understanding of identity clashes. 
 
4.2. Thesis’s sources and analytical tools: 
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This thesis relies upon some key research devices, such as interviews, field observation, the 
analysis of primary documents and news sources and a critical survey of existing literature. 
Together these sources provide the suitable materials with which to answer the research questions.  
The fieldwork was carried out by the author in Syria between February 2012 and October 2012. 
During this period, the author was working as a reporter for the Associated Press. Also, the author 
conducted fieldwork in Lebanon in December 2012 and January 2013. Additionally, online 
interviews (via Skype and via email) were conducted by the author between March 2011 and 
March 2013. The first name of some participants has been published according to their request 
while others have asked to be anonymous. Also, some other participants opted to be identified by 
pseudonym. The date and the place of all interviews have been published according to the 
participants’ approval.  The author has selected the interviewees with the aim of obtaining as 
representative a sample of each identity group as possible. 
 
4.3. Limitations of the thesis: 
The main limitations of this study are those of sources and scope. Firstly, the accuracy of the 
sources is hampered somewhat by the propaganda that concerns all actors involved in the Syrian 
uprising.  It is extremely challenging to ascertain the accuracy of the online materials and 
information that relates each identity group, such as news of ethnic torture and mass killings.  In 
effort to obviate this limitation, this thesis focuses mainly on the implications of such data on 
identity clashes regardless of their accuracy. As it was beyond the scope of this thesis to verify this 
data, the thesis assumes that such account have the same catalysing implications on identity clashes 
regardless of their verity. Secondly, the scope of this thesis is limited by the complexity of its 
subject matter. At the time of the writing, the situation was rapidly evolving, and for this reason 
the thesis utilises a fixed timeframe and specific cases that appropriately represent each identity 
group. 
4.4. Definition of Terms: ‘secular’ and ‘Islamist’: 
These are each controversial terms that have various interpretations in the literature and hence it 





secular to the “French laïcité” model which limits religion to the private sphere,48 and stresses that 
political authority “should not be in the business of imposing or advancing or privileging any 
particular religion”.49  The term ‘Islamist’ is used to signify individuals or groups who identify 
themselves definitively with Islam. On the other hand, the term ‘fundamentalist’ indicates 
individuals or groups whose sine quo non is the reestablishment of Muslim ethos and the creation 
of an Islamic state. 50   The following chapters elaborate on the classification of these terms 
according to each case study. 
 
 
5. Thesis’ structure: 
Chapter two of this thesis provides a historical background to the question of identity in Syria and 
delivers an informative summary on the Syrian uprising. Chapter three examines the identity 
clashes between the Sunnis and the Alawites, in which it provides analyses of the roles of the 
Syrian regime, Syrian Sunni political entrepreneurs, external state and non-states actors and the 
role of symbols in sparking clashes between Alawites and Sunnis. Chapter four examines the 
reconstruction of the Kurdish identity from above by the policies of Syria’s regime, it also concerns 
the actions of Kurdish political actors and external state and non-state political entrepreneurs, in 
addition to examine the roles of symbolic features in reconstructing Kurdish identity at the 
grassroots level. Chapter five evaluates the attempts of anti-Assad political actors to craft a Syrian 
national identity, and studies the sense of Syrianism that emerge from below. The conclusion will 
summarise the findings of the thesis. 
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Identity dilemma in Syria: from authoritarianism to uprising51 
 
 
The identity clashes that exploded in the uprising seem to be rooted in Syria’s modern history. 
Although Syria enjoyed relative sectarian stability during the Assads tenure, the uprising 
indicates that the problem of identity was buried away rather than addressed. In order to set 
the stage for a critical analysis of identity clashes during the uprising, the first section of this 
chapter provides the historical background to the Alawite, Sunni, Kurdish and Syrian national 
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The identity puzzle in Syria (1946-2011): 
 
Historically, Syria is composed of various identity groups since its geostrategic position in the 
Levant set it as the cross-road for the movement of goods and people and also as a crucible of 
religions. For some four hundred years (1516-1916), Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire, 
however, the post-World War I settlement divided the Empire’s heritage between France and 
Britain. As a result, present-day Syria comprising different identity groups, was granted to the 
French mandate.52 Subsequently, the problematic questions of ‘Who are we? Are we Syrians; 
Arabs; Kurds; Sunnis; Alawites, etc.?’ Have been left unsolved. Having been created by outsiders 
this newly invented state, with artificial boundaries imposed on a mosaic society of multiple ethnic 
and sectarian groups, did not create a solid national identity. Certainly, the legacy of the mandate 
played an essential role in enhancing communal identities. The French applied divide-and-rule 
politics and sought to exploit sectarian loyalties to maintain their control, thus thwarting the 
creation of a national identity that would include Syria’s various identity groups. France’s policies 
reinforced the Alawite identity against the Sunni identity, as the French mandate offered the 
Alawites a temporary quasi-autonomy.53 Alawites are followers of the Alawite sect, an offshoot 
of Shiite Islam, comprising an estimated 12% of Syria’s total population, inhabiting the coastal 
areas in the interior lowlands east of the Alawite Mountains and the rural areas around cities of 
Homs and Hama. Experts note that throughout its history, the Alawite community has been 
persecuted politically, socially and economically. Furthermore, the Alawite community has been 
dominated by a hostile Sunni community that has disparaged the Alawite religious beliefs.54 The 
Sunni majority, consisting an estimated 69% of the population, perceived the Alawites as an 
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outsider group and sought hegemony over them.55 Consequently, France’s policies provided the 
Alawite identity with opportunities for empowerment, however, by offering them autonomous 
authority, the French, like the Sunnis, excluded the Alawites from a Syrian national identity. 
Similarly, French policies bolstered the Kurds’ transnational affiliation while seeking to 
manipulate the Kurdish identity. The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority, making up about 10% 
of the Syrian population, who, generally speaking, are Muslim Sunnis inhabiting the north-east of 
Syria. In fact, the demise of the Ottoman Empire created an opportunity for the Kurds to achieve 
their nation-state which is separate from Syria, and therefore, they cooperated with the French who 
provided the Kurdish enclaves with limited autonomous measures, seeking to construct an alliance 
with the Kurds to counter the Arab nationalists. Hence, many Syrian Arabs associated the Kurdish 
identity with external power and separatism, and consequently, the Kurds were excluded from a 
Syrian identity.56 The end of the French mandate did not result in the granting of a separate state 
to the Kurds, instead, an anti-Kurdish sentiment grew among Syrian Arabs, which negatively 
influenced the Kurdish integration into the Syrian state. 
In fact, Syria’s ultimate independence in April 1946 presented challenges and opportunities to 
construct a national identity for the newborn territorial state. Yet, given the mandate’s legacy and 
the historical record of splits between the various identity groups, this chance seems to have been 
lost, as each identity group pursued its own self-interest. In this vein, during the early years of 
independence (1946-1949), Syria’s political scene was dominated by urban Sunnis who did not 
formulate strategies to develop a national identity, but instead, were struggling for power.57 The 
Alawites, on the other hand, were seeking empowerment and a reduction of their minority status, 
and therefore sought to hold rank in military institutions.58 The Kurds, however, limited their 
pursuit of separation to a quest for political and sociocultural rights. Nevertheless, Kurdish identity 
was marginalised politically, socially and culturally as Syrian Arabs continued to view the Kurdish 
minority with suspicions of separatism, that is, they again identified the Kurds as outsiders.59 In 
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this context, between 1946 and 1963, three key identities dominated Syria’s political realm and 
competed for power. These were; pan-Arabism, seeking affiliation with the Arab states; Pan-
Syrianism, promoting the establishment of Greater Syria that would include Lebanon, Jordan and 
Palestine; and pan-Islamism, advancing the association with the Islamic Uma. However, pan-
Arabism emerged as the dominant identity and was the most applicable since it “bridged the Syrian 
‘mosaic’ bringing together the Arabic-speaking minorities, most significantly the Alawites and 
Christians, with the Sunni majority, albeit excluding non-Arabs such as the Kurds”.60 Indeed, the 
rise of the Arab Nationalist ideology prompted an official discrimination against the Kurdish 
identity. Furthermore, in October 1962, the Syrian authority conducted a so-called special census 
in the Kurdish areas, during which some 120,000 Kurds were denationalised, because the Syrian 
regime claimed that they had illegally entered Syria from Turkey. Besides this, significant 
elements of the Kurdish identity, such as language, music and publications were banned. This 
clearly emphasised the ethnic line between the Kurdish and the Syrian Arab identity.61 
Against this backdrop, Syria’s late president Hafiz Assad (1971-2000), a master in the art of 
realpolitik, attempted to construct a balance between Arab, Syrian and Islamic identities and also 
between the Alawite, Sunni and Kurdish identity groups.  He sought to craft a national identity 
that would include these three identities, yet he took a contradictory approach. Essentially, Assad 
made use of the Arab nationalist ideology to legitimise his Alawite regime and to establish a 
national identity in which all identity groups could be assimilated.62 Since Assad belonged to the 
Alawite minority, he adopted a Khaldounian/neo-patrimonial strategy to build his regime. This 
strategy relied on the Alawite Asabiyya “group feeling”63 to forge a coherent elite, commanding 
high ranking positions in political and military institutions. Indeed, Alawite Asabiyya signifies the 
backbone of the Assad regime, notwithstanding, Assad never engaged in a direct Alawite rhetoric, 
he only covertly exploited the Alawite identity and encouraged the Alawites to view the regime as 
‘theirs’ without ever admitting this publicly. But still, by Asabiyya, Assad emphasised the Alawite 
identity against that of the Sunnis and provoked these two identity groups to perceive each other 
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as rivals. Additionally, Assad’s strategy was underpinned by neo-patrimonial logic which denotes 
that a leader maintains his power through personal patronage in the bureaucratic institutions and 
not through law, and hence this system is constructed by loyalties.64 As the distinguished expert 
on Syria, Raymond Hinnebusch put it this way: “[Under Hafiz Assad,] Alawi[te] identity and 
cohesion was enhanced and Alawi[te]s in power often followed the code of a kinship society in 
favoring their kin in recruitment, and, most significantly in admission to the officer corps”.65 The 
core of the Assad formula of state-building, relied upon the Alawite Asabiyya that prevented a 
Syrian national identity from functioning properly and diminished its credibility in the eyes of 
Syrians, as a particular identity group was favoured, despite the tangible alliance that Assad 
constructed with Sunnis and regardless of the fact that officially, all Syrian citizens were supposed 
to be equal. Yet, once in office, Assad sought to contain the risk the Sunni majority might pose to 
his rule and therefore, he shrewdly constructed a social contract with Sunni peasantry in the rural 
areas and also crafted an alliance with urban Sunnis.66 In essence, Assad employed carrot-and-
stick tactics, vis-à-vis his rival Sunnis, through which he crushed the most powerful Islamic 
adversary of that time, the Muslim Brotherhood. In February 1982, Assad suppressed a Sunni 
rebellion in Hama that was seeking to dominate the Alawites. Nevertheless, soon afterward, he 
aimed to have “accommodated and empowered the apolitical Islamic organisations”.67 By doing 
so, Assad sought to establish status quo with the Sunni majority and to foster a state-controlled 
Islam. 68  Nonetheless, Assad policies were colored by divide-and-rule politics which placed 
different identity groups at odds with one another, such as the Arabs versus the Kurds and Islamists 
versus secularists.  This subsequently increased the fragmentation of identity.69 
In parallel, the political, social and cultural exclusion of the Kurdish identity by the dominant 
Arabism ideology continued during the Hafiz Assad tenure. However, Assad opted to adopt a more 
pragmatic approach and placed the Arabism ideology as a supra-national identity. As regards the 
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Kurds, Assad conducted selective measures to integrate the Kurds into the Arab Syrian Republic, 
such as including some Kurds in governmental institutions. Nevertheless, they were restricted to 
low rank positions and the Kurdish parties remained ‘outsiders’ who also suffered from internal 
division. Furthermore, any symbolic expression of the Kurdish identity continued to be a taboo. In 
short, Assad applied a mixture of manipulation, divide-and-rule and carrot-and-stick politics, 
seeking out a balance between redistribution and coercion vis-à-vis the Kurdish problem. 
Therefore, with an iron fist, he suppressed any attempts to empower the Kurdish identity, whilst 
on the other hand, he constructed an alliance with some Kurdish nationalists and parties (with 
Kurdistan Worker Party PKK). 70  Also, Assad allied with some Kurds of the religious 
brotherhoods, such as Ahmad Kuftaru, the Mufti of the Republic (d. 2004), and the prominent 
cleric Ramadan al-Buti (d. 2013). Assad’s objective with this coalition, was to encourage the Arab-
Kurdish brotherhood and merge, under an Islamic umbrella, the Kurdish identity into a Syrian 
Arab identity.  Moreover, Assad used the Kurds to counter his internal and regional foes and to 
accomplish realpolitik ends that, as a result, reinforced the Kurdish identity versus the Arab 
identity and hindered their integration into an inclusive Syrian identity. For instance, in the late 
1970s, Assad exploited the Kurdish identity in his rivalry with Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi 
president, by allowing Iraqi Kurdish nationalists to establish a temporary safe haven in the Syrian 
Kurdish areas that border Iraq. Similarly, in 1982, Assad mobilised Kurdish factions in his 
suppression of the Islamist revolt which subsequently deepened the Arab-Kurdish splits since the 
Arab majority regarded the Kurds as the regime’s partner in suppressing the Sunni Arab 
rebellion.71 Moreover, in the late 1980s until mid-1990s, the Turkish-Syrian conflict, over issues 
of water and borders, prompted Assad to play the Kurdish card in an attempt to exert pressure on 
Turkey. This was done by allowing the PPK,- a mass party with a paramilitary wing, based in 
Turkey and seeking the ‘liberation’ of Kurdistan- to establish bases in Syria, from which it 
launched attacks against the Turkish army. This geostrategic cooperation ended when Assad 
succumbed to the Turkish pressure and withdrew support for the PKK.72 Parallel to his policies 
vis-à-vis the Sunni identity and the Alawite identity, Hafiz Assad’s strategies toward the Kurds 
                                                          
70 Jordi Tejel Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society,(London: Routledge,2009), p. 84-89 
71 Ibid, p.  66-67 





bolstered communal affiliations and diminished the chances of building a cohesive national 
identity. 
In this context, Bashar Assad inherited the presidency in June 2000 and strove to advance his 
father’s approach in a way that eventually triggered identity clashes. The first two years of Bashar’s 
term were marked by a flourish of civil society movements and labeled the Damascus Spring.73 
These movements were led by members of the Syrian intelligentsia from various political 
backgrounds, such as Michal Kilo and Haytham Manna’a. The Damascus Spring looked for 
political reforms and promoted a national identity that sought to eliminate sectarian loyalties. Yet, 
shortly, the so-called Damascus Spring turned into winter as a result of the regime’s repression. 
However, it should be stressed that the civil movements of Damascus Spring did not present a 
unified opposition platform and furthermore, ideological and personal conflicts among its 
members, together with Assad’s suppression, caused its demise.74  Some three years later, in 
October 2005, a group of opposition figures based in Syria and in exile, co-founded Damascus 
Declaration (DD), an umbrella opposition coalition that called for gradual and peaceful transition 
to a multiple democratic state. In fact, the DD was the first significant attempt to tackle the question 
of identity directly. It intended to foster Syrian national sentiment and to merge the various sects 
of the Syrian community into a solid national identity. In other words, based on a civic model of 
national identity, the DD sought to stress the equality of all Syrians, regardless of their ethnic and 
sectarian backgrounds. However, like the Damascus Spring, suppression by the authoritarian 
regime and internal fragmentation deactivated the DD’s goals.75 Henceforth, the endeavour by 
Syrian intelligentsia to bolster a national affiliation waned. 
Although the official speech of Bashar Assad endorsed Syrian nationalism under the umbrella of 
Arabism, he seemed to follow in his father’s footsteps in relying on sectarian loyalties.  Alawite 
Asabiyya continued to represent the hard core of the regime.  In this light, Carsten Wieland argues, 
that during Bashar’s tenure “the regime had become more Alawite compared to Hafez’s time”.76 
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A good indicator is the fall of some Sunni old guard of Hafiz’s regime such as the former vice 
president, Abdul al-halim Khaddam, and the former Chief of staff Hikmat Shihabi.  Moreover, 
Bashar advanced an economic liberalisation project that unintentionally backfired on the issue of 
identity and damaged the tangible balance that Hafiz Assad constructed between the identity 
groups. In short, the neo-liberal economic project by Bashar was directed to empower the elite 
whether Sunni or Alawite and was mainly directed toward the benefit of the big cities, like 
Damascus and Aleppo whilst neglecting the socio-economic conditions of other cities and towns, 
such like Dar’a (southern Syria) and Banias (western Syria). This, subsequently, widened the 
socio-economic gaps and demolished the social contract that Hafez Assad strove to establish with 
Sunni workers, peasants and members of the rural class.77  In fact, Bashar’s policies enriched a 
loyal group of crony capitalists, such as Bashar’s first cousin, Rami Makhlouf, who played a vital 
role in triggering Sunni identity against that of Alawites as he enjoyed an absolute monopoly over 
Syria’s economic affairs.78 Although the former allied with some Sunni businessmen, like Ratib 
al-Shalah and Mohamed Hmashu, he still excluded other urban Sunnis and also, importantly, 
excluded the deprived Sunnis of the remote areas. Hereafter, in the eyes of many Sunnis, Bashar’s 
economic project was limited to the regime-connected cronies who were drawn from his clan and 
the Sunni bourgeoisie. In fact, this revived class/communal hatreds and reinforced the Alawite 
identity against that of the Sunnis.  Not surprisingly, offices belonging to Makhlouf were among 
the governmental buildings targeted by Sunni protesters in Dar’a during the early days of the 2011 
uprising.79 Yet, it has to be noted that many Sunnis who benefited from the regime policy stood 
with the Assad regime against the uprising. 
Indeed, Bashar sought to co-opt the Islamic movements and to advance the status quo that his 
father crafted with Sunni factions.80 Thus, he deployed several procedures, such as giving a free 
hand to Sufi movements -Sufism is the largely non-political tradition of Sunnism which focuses 
on the role of Islamic principles in regulating society-, and turning a blind eye to Qubayssiat - a 
group of Sunni women established in Damascus by Munira al-Qubaysi during the 1960s to 
promote an apolitical Islam focusing on personal piety. Remarkably, during the Assad’s tenure 
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Qubayssiat “operated a powerful network among the wives, daughter and mothers of affluent 
businessmen in Damascus”-.81  In parallel, Assad junior intended to present himself as a good 
Muslim in the eyes of Sunnis and therefore, throughout his presidency, he regularly attended 
religious ceremonies and, unlike his father, he permitted the presentation of Sunni symbols during 
celebration of religious events.82 Ostensibly, Assad’s objective was twofold: firstly to legitimise 
his rule among Sunnis and secondly, to counter the secular opposition. Nevertheless, his tactical 
alliance with Sufis in Damascus did not mend fences with all Sunnis of Syria, particularly with 
those of the remote areas who were deprived as a result of the regime’s neo-liberal approaches. 
Furthermore, no realistic political representation was given to Islamists, although some Islamist 
members were represented in the parliament, for example, Sheikh Mohamed Habash, who often 
appeared on Syrian State TV, talking about moderate Islam (‘al-Islam al mu’atadil’). It was very 
much believed among Sunnis that those members were only tools in the hand of the regime. 
Apparently, Bashar Assad’s policy of advancing his father’s regime contained myriad flaws that 
triggered the identity issue. He opened up the economy, but only for particular identity groups, 
namely, Alawite patrons and the Sunni elite. His alliance included a specific faction of Sunnis, 
urban businessmen, and the Sufi clergy, whilst discounting the Sunni peasantry in rural areas. 
Furthermore, in addition to his manipulation of the Sufi identity, Bashar instrumentalised the 
Salafis - Salafism is a branch of Sunnism that aims to restructure the state and the society in line 
with Quranic and Sharia law-83 for realpolitik gains. As during the early years of the 2000s, Bashar 
allowed some Syrian Salafis to infiltrate Iraq to counter the U.S. Consequently, his approaches 
bolstered a Salafi sentiment that is at odds with the Sufis, the Alawites and the secularists.84 
On the other hand, the Kurdish identity was excluded from the circle of power and from the 
expression of any symbolic features. Like his father, Bashar employed both hard-power and soft-
power strategies towards the Kurdish question. Yet, unprecedentedly, vehement confrontations 
erupted between the Arab and the Kurds in March 2004 in the town of Qamishli, northeast of 
Syria, when a football match between a Kurdish affiliated team and an Arab team provoked clashes 
between the two sets of fans. The Arabs were displaying portraits of Saddam Hussein while the 
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Kurds were chanting pro-American slogans that triggered the fight. In brief, the Assad regime 
responded by suppressing the Kurds and this prompted anti-Assad protests to spread throughout 
the Kurdish enclaves. Unsurprisingly, Syria’s Arab majority took the side of the regime, 
associating the Kurds with external power and separatist motivation, and as a result, it reinforced 
the line between the Kurdish and the Arab identity.85 After punishing the protesters, Assad junior 
successfully re-established the status quo with the Kurds through mediators in the Kurdish 
community.86 Nevertheless, the political, social and cultural marginalisation of the Kurds resumed 
and furthermore, in 2009, a drought in the Kurdish area affected 1.3 million inhabitants, most of 
whom were underprivileged Kurds. In September 2009, some 300,000 inhabitants of Raqa and 
Hassaka fled to makeshift camps on the edges of Damascus. The Syrian government could not 
develop a suitable strategy to remedy this situation, rather the security services suppressed Syrian 




Present-day Syria came into existence as a result of the political game of the world’s great powers 
that imposed political borders on a heterogeneous community. Therefore, neither a solid national 
identity nor a sense of nationhood underpinned the creation of the Syrian state. Instead, sectarian 
cleavages persisted between Sunnis, Alawites and the Kurds and furthermore, they were 
aggravated. Each of these identity groups was seeking to exclude the other. In this context, it was 
an extremely challenging mission to unite these identity groups into a harmonious unit, 
particularly, if a long-oppressed minority came to rule a hostile majority. It should, therefore, be 
said that Hafiz Assad sought to balance these competing identities and to create a national 
cohesion, but through a contradictory approach. Simultaneously, Hafiz Assad employed soft-
power and hard-power strategies to assimilate Sunnis, Kurds and the Alawite into an inclusive 
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national identity. However, the Khaldounian/neo-patrimonial formula of Assad senior, upgraded 
by Assad junior, thwarted the formation of a strong national identity and instead, bolstered 
communal identities. Moreover, both Assads manipulated Sunni, Alawite and Kurdish identities 
to consolidate their power and, whereas their policies worked throughout some four decades, their 
long-term implications proved to be lethal. In addition, the economic liberalisation project of 
Bashar Assad seemed to destroy the fragile balance between sectarian identities that his father built 
up over some thirty years. 
 Yet, this is not to say that policies of the Assad dynasty, are solely responsible for the eruption of 
identity clashes during the uprising. Rather, as has been argued above, in the establishment of the 
current Syria, a concrete national identity was not achieved and each sectarian group was seeking 
empowerment. Nevertheless, the Assads’ rhetoric vis-à-vis Alawite, Sunni and Kurdish identities, 
caused more fragmentation in an already fractured national identity and played off the identity 





The Syrian uprising: an informative summary: 
In late February 2011, a group of boys, aged between 10 and 15, wrote anti-regime graffiti on the 
walls of their school in Dar’a, in the southeast of Syria, which stated: ‘the people want to overthrow 
the regime’. This was in fact, the motto of the so-called Arab Spring, which protesters in Egypt, 
Yemen and Libya, at that time, were broadcasting throughout the Arab world through their chant. 
The arrest and torture of the Dar’a boys by Syria’s security services provoked civil activists in 
Damascus to declare 15th March 2011 as a ‘Day of Rage’ against the authoritarian regime. In that 
day, dozens of secular youths marched in the heart of Damascus, chanting slogans for freedom and 
dignity. Shortly afterward however, the regime forces punished them. 88  Three days later, 
                                                          





thousands of protesters who were mostly underprivileged Sunnis, marched in Dar’a, calling for 
political reforms, whilst excluding the fall of Assad from their demands.  The Syrian regime forces 
responded with an iron fist, firing life ammunition on the crowd and consequently inciting 
protesters to upgrade their demands to the ousting of Bashar Assad.89 From this point onward, the 
Syrian uprising was triggered. Pictures and footages of protests were circulated in the social media, 
which as the following chapters will illustrate, played a vital role in fueling identity clashes. 
Rapidly, anti-Assad demonstrations spread to ethnically-mixed Syrian cities and towns such as 
Banias, Homs, Hama and Idlib in western Syria. Protesters of these areas were mostly pious Sunnis 
who suffered from marginalisation due to Bashar’s economic policies. Importantly, from this time 
forth, the socio-economic background of protesters was not limited to the secular educated youth 
of urban middle-class who had initially orchestrated the ‘Day of Anger’ in Damascus. 
The Assad regime, as the next chapter will discuss in detail, employed hard-power methods to 
eliminate the uprising. The regime associated protesters with external powers and with 
fundamentalists whilst characterising the uprising as a ‘conspiracy’ against the Arab Nationalist 
ideology of Syria, and also as fitna (‘sedition’) that aims to ruin Syria’s sectarian stability. 
Moreover, since the outset of the uprising, Assad’s policies exploited Alawite Asabiyya to suppress 
the rebellion. Similarly, Assad manipulated his longstanding alliance with the Sunni merchant 
class and with some Sufi clergymen to counter his rivals. 90 In fact, July 2011 marked a turning 
point in the uprising, as soldiers then started to defect from the Syrian Army and, together with 
some civil rebels, they founded the Free Syrian Army (FSA) -a paramilitary wing of the rebellion- 
and henceforth, the uprising turned into an armed struggle. Although, anti-Assad militias 
mushroomed, a united leadership for these militias was not established. Moreover, like the 
majority of civil protesters, these paramilitaries were dominated by Sunnis.91 Also, importantly, 
radical Islamists came to play a pivotal role in the uprising, as these groups were the most 
committed, the best fighters and were on the ground in Syria, unlike much of the secular opposition 
that went into exile.  On the other hand, from the onset of the uprising, the classic Syrian opposition 
strove for empowerment and therefore myriad parties, movements, coalitions and councils 
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emerged. Few were based in Syria, while the others were formed in exile.  Yet, Syria’s political 
opposition is deeply fragmented and has not managed to form a monolithic platform, suffering 
instead from personal and ideological divisions. 92 In this context, as the following chapters will 
discuss, external state and non-state actors played significant roles in the uprising, by providing 
political, military and economic support for a particular group against the other. These actors were 
involved in the uprising for realpolitik gains and, henceforward, they shifted the uprising into a 
proxy war among regional and international powers. 
Conclusion: 
The Syrian uprising has its roots in a peaceful movement that demanded social justice, and yet, it 
rapidly morphed into an armed struggle between various actors. The uprising is characterised by 
deep divisions between all the anti-Assad factions, such as: rural /urban, secular/Islamist and the 
new-generation/old-generation. More importantly, as the following chapters will demonstrate, the 





The continuous reproduction of the Sunni and Alawite identities 
At the time of writing, there is an ongoing and vigorous fight for hegemony between the Sunni 
identity and the Alawite identity. The status quo that existed between the two identity groups has 
been destroyed, with each party attempting to maximise its gains over the other. This chapter 
addresses the interaction between the several elements that account for this conflict. The chapter 
is divided into two main sections; the first section examines the orchestration of Sunni and Alawite 
identity clashes from above, focusing on the roles of the Syrian regime, the Sunni political 
entrepreneurs and the external state and non-state actors. The second section analyses the roles of 
symbolic features in inciting identity clashes from below. 
                                                          





1. Orchestrating Sunni and Alawite identity clashes from above: 
1.1 The Syrian regime rhetoric vis-à-vis the uprising: playing with sectarian fire? 
Since its very beginnings, the Syrian regime has responded to the uprising as an ‘internal crisis’ 
that endangers the very existence of the regime. Accordingly, the regime’s objectives were to crush 
the uprising and then to institute some reforms for containing any future risk of another uprising 
breaking out.  However, this approach has only served to exacerbate the ‘crisis’ and in doing so 
has proved itself to be irrational. As observers agree, the Syrian regime played the sectarian card 
since the outbreak of the uprising by inciting the Alawite religious minority to fight against a Sunni 
majority, and by continuously accusing fundamentalists of tatiyyf   (‘sectarianisation’) the ‘crisis’. 
In parallel, the regime strove to promote itself as the only entity capable of preventing civil war 
and of maintaining the sectarian stability.93 
 
In essence, the Syrian regime employed two strategies in dealing with the uprising, both of which 
have had significant repercussions on the reproduction of Alawite and Sunni identities. These 
strategies have been labeled as al-hal al-‘amny (‘security solution’) and al-hal al-‘askary 
(‘military solution’).94 To briefly clarify, the ‘security solution’ was activated in April 2011, and 
denotes the deployment of forces loyal to the regime, namely the security services and Shabiyyha. 
Shabiyyha refers to the pro-Assad militias that consisted mainly of Alawites, and which played a 
vital role in the uprising. According to an Alawite resident of Homs, who has relatives working 
with a Shabiyha network operating in Damascus, a Shabiyh (singular of Shabiyha) earns around 
$300 per month and works an eight-hour day.95 In Arabic, Shabiha comes from the word Shabah, 
meaning ‘ghost’. Originally, it referred to the Alawite mafia that operated during the 1970s under 
Riffat Assad (uncle of Bashar Assad), and which “smuggled contraband, all the while earning a 
reputation for unrelenting violence”.96 During the uprising, the security services and Shabiyyha 
consisted primarily of Alawites, whose main mission was to punish anti-Assad activists, the 
majority of whom were Sunnis.  Unlike the security services, who are official employers at 
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governmental institutions, Shabiyyha networks were not formally registered as government forces, 
despite having been funded and armed by the regime and some of its patrons.97 
With the eruption of the uprising, these loyalist forces frequently besieged and attacked mosques 
in rebel areas that were the primary sites for anti-Assad protests, and which were mainly to be 
found in Sunni districts. Some cases in point are jdiyydyt ‘artuz in northern Damascus. Here, the 
Shabiha reside in masaken al-hars (‘Guards’ Houses’), established in 1998, a type of residential 
compound located north of jdiyydyt ‘artuz where Alawite officers and soldiers reside with their 
families. During the uprising, these Alawite forces besieged the central mosque in jdiyydyt ‘artuz 
and attacked protesters. 98 This situation also applied to Homs, where Shabiyyha of the muhajreen 
quarter (a lower-class district at the edges of eastern Homs predominated by Alawites), cracked 
down on protesters in the nearby dyr-b’lba area, which is inhabited mainly by Sunnis. According 
to an Alawite resident of Homs, Shabiyyha of muhajreen played an essential role in the clashes 
between Sunnis and Alawites. In his own words: 
 
“Muhajreen’s Shabiha protected our areas. Without them, the Sunnis would have smashed us”.99 
 
Notably, forces loyal to the regime often displayed identifiers of their communal belongings, such 
as the Zulfiqar sword. A sword with two blades that the Islamic Prophet Mohamed gave to his 
cousin Ali bin abi Talib, this sword is an important holy symbol for Alawites and Shiites.100 
Additionally, many members of the regime’s forces revealed tattoos that depicted their religious 
identity. For instance, one member’s tattoo was a piece of Arabic script, which read ya Ali (‘Oh 
Ali’) referring to Ali bin abi Taleb, an Alawite icon.101 Moreover, members of the security forces 
and Shabiyyha deliberately spoke with strong Alawite accents while undertaking their mission.102 
Expressively, these symbolic features acted as signifiers of the Alawite identity and emphasised 
the sectarian line between Alawites and the other identity groups. 
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In such a context, the regime’s security solution could not come to fruition. Instead, the ‘crisis’ 
began to accelerate rapidly, as the violence used against protesters turned more and more Syrians 
against the regime. Most importantly, the Alawites’ involvement in combating the rebels resulted 
in a Sunni counter-mobilisation. In February 2012, the regime’s ‘security solution’ was upgraded 
to a ‘military solution’, which involved the nationwide deployment of the Syrian army and heavy 
shelling of rebel regions. Homs, in western Syria, was the first zone to be subjected to this military 
solution. On the ground, bombardments targeted Sunni areas such as bab-‘amur of Homs. The fact 
that the Alawite quarters in the very same district remained unharmed by the shelling helped to 
fuel the Sunni versus Alawite identity clashes. For instance, during the regime’s military 
operations in bab-‘amur in February 2012, Alawite districts like al-zahra and al-nizha that are 
approximately 6km away from  bab-‘amur remained completely unscathed by the nearby artillery 
fire. Furthermore, these areas were not subjected to the same humanitarian crisis resulting from 
fuel and food shortages as the Sunni districts were subjected to. An Alawite resident of al-nizha 
gave an eyewitness account of the situation at the time: 
 
“Life looks very normal here. Most shops are open, flour and fuel are available. You can see people 
smoking shisha at the coffee shops. We hear the shelling next door, we try to act normally, but all 
of us are afraid. None of us dares to leave hartu (‘his alley’)”.103 
Furthermore, the regime’s forces established their bases in some Alawite districts, such as in 
masaken al-hars of jdiyydyt ‘artuz, 104  from which they targeted Sunni areas. Additionally, 
Shabiyyha and soldiers allowed themselves to be filmed as they tortured Sunni protesters while 
speaking in tough Alawite accents. Such videos were widely circulated among Syrians on social 
media and on other online mainstream networks, and they elicited a collective radicalisation of 
Sunni identity. However, given the propaganda war of disinformation between all sides, the 
accuracy of such accounts cannot be verified. Nevertheless, such videos catalysed the same process 
of the reinforcement of sectarian identities amongst the various identity groups. Viewed in this 
light, the regime loyal forces’ looting of houses in hot zones, (and the selling of these looted items 
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in public markets established mostly in Alawite districts) is one of the consequences of this chaotic 
situation. These markets were dubbed as souq al-sunnih li al-masrwqat, (‘the Sunni market for 
looted items’). One popular market was located nearby masaken al-hars in the mu’damiyaa area, 
northern jdiyydyt ‘artuz. Here, furniture and electronic devices like LCD televisions and IPads 
were displayed under huge portraits of Assad, and in which the salesmen were members of the 
Alawite identity group.105 Certainly, looting can be viewed as a natural consequence of civil wars, 
and is provoked by poverty and chaos. However, regardless of whether the looting was motivated 
by poverty or ethnic grievances, it constituted a direct violation of the ‘others’ identity. 
Consequently, the looting helped to inflame the Sunni versus Alawite identity clashes. 
Seemingly, by deploying Alawite-dominated forces, the Syrian regime projected the uprising as a 
sectarian conflict and an anti-Alawite movement. As a result, Alawites were made to feel that they 
were fighting for their survival. Certainly, as is discussed below, the policies and discourses of 
many anti-Assad Sunnis have verified the claims of the regime. Therefore, many Alawites could 
not perceive any alternative way of surviving other than to fight for the regime. Salim, an Alawite 
colonel of Homs, stresses that Alawites are fighting with the Assad forces for their own survival 
rather than for Assad per se. In his own words: 
“We are a minority here and the Sunnis want to drive us out. The question is not about Bashar as 
a person, but if he goes, the Alawites will be in danger”.106 
Hence, the security dilemma clearly interplayed with the regime’s policies, and consequently 
positioned the Alawite identity at odds with that of the Sunnis. A 28-year-old Alawite of Latakia 
expressed fears for the Alawites fate in post-Assad era: 
“Although Latakia is relatively calm, we are extremely afraid. They [anti-Assad Sunnis] claim that 
they will forgive those Alawites who do not have blood on their hands. But how they would be 
able to identify every single Alawite who has blood on his hands? And what would happen to us 
if the regime failed? I keep asking myself”.107 
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It is worthy to note here that this thesis does not suggest that the Alawite are united in their stances 
vis-à-vis the uprising. Rather the thesis argues that the Syrian regime instrumentalised Alawites 
for realpolitik ends. More importantly, it seems that the security dilemma interacts with the regime 
policies and triggered the majority of Alawites to support Assad for their own survival. Indeed, 
the insecurity crisis has provoked Alawites who reside in ethnically mixed areas to flee to the 
villages that they originally came from. Manar, a 26 year-old Sunni of jdiyydyt ‘artuz assures that, 
with the escalation of the violence, Alawite men of masaken el-haras evacuated their families for 
fear that they would be executed. This, in his eyes, is likely to be occurring in a post-Assad era. 
Manar blames not only the regime for initiating the clashes between Alawites and Sunnis, but also 
those Alawites who, according to him, have allowed themselves to be manipulated by the regime: 
“Prior to the uprising, Alawites of masaken al-haras seemed to integrate fairly well with the Sunnis 
of ‘artuz town. They used to send their children to schools in jdiyydyt ‘artuz and do their shopping 
there. Everything looked normal at that time, but after the uprising I do not think that these 
Alawites would be able to live peacefully with us again. I do not know what would happen, but 
what I’m sure about is that in a post-Assad era, masaken al-haras would not stand there anymore. 
Not a single Alawite would be allowed to stay there. Too much blood has been shed by them”.108 
As the conflict continued to escalate, several incidents of mass killing were reported, particularly 
in areas that are divided across ethnic lines and in which each identity group tends to blame the 
other for perpetrating such killings. A case in point is the al-houla massacre, al-houla is a tiny town 
northwest of Homs that is dominated by Sunnis. The massacre took place on the evening of May 
25, 2012 when armed men killed 92 Sunni civilians, including 32 children. The Syrian regime 
accused ‘terrorist gangs’, while Sunni rebels claimed that the perpetrators were Alawite men from 
the bordering town of al-qabu, which is mostly populated by Shiite and Alawites.109 A second case 
in point took place in jdiyydyt ‘artuz on the 1st of August 2012 in which, Sunni residents of ‘artuz 
interviewed by the author, claimed that Alawites of masaken al-haras executed some 35 anti-
Assad Sunnis. However, only one week before the massacre, Sunni rebels of jdiyydyt ‘artuz 
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kidnapped three Alawite men from masaken al-haras.110 Graphic videos of the brutal killings that 
showed how some of the dead had been killed with knives or blunt objects spread like wildfire 
through the online mainstream community, which consequently intensified the security dilemma 
for both identity groups. In March 2013, a United Nations Human Rights report assured that 
Assad’s forces had “commit[ed] mass killings which are at times sectarian in nature”.111 Yet, the 
report stresses that both sides were guilty of carrying out violations against civilians during the 
conflict, and that Sunni militants executed Alawite militiamen and established detention centers in 
Homs and Aleppo. Moreover, an enormous number of video clips uploaded to the internet showed 
Sunni militants torturing Alawites. Some Sunnis applauded these videos, while others strongly 
denounced the use of such rhetoric.112 Despite the fact that the authenticity of these videos and the 
accuracy of the reports of mass killings cannot be guaranteed, their existence gives a broad 
indication of the nature of the insecurity crisis that each identity group was confronting. This 
situation served to intensify the identity clashes. 
Against this backdrop, the Syrian regime’s policies of security and military solutions vis-à-vis the 
uprising were designed to eliminate the ‘crisis’. However, these policies failed to quell the 
uprising. Seemingly, the core of these policies rested on the concept of Alawite Asabiyya, which 
reinforces the Alawite identity and reproduces that of the Sunnis. One can argue that the Assad 
regime was able to exploit Asabiyya to mobilise Alawites from different socio-economic 
backgrounds; from lower-class like the muhajreen in Homs to the ranks of the elite, of which his 
cousin Rami Makhlouf was a member. Together, these socially disparate Alawites would fight 
against the uprising and link their survival explicitly to that of Assad. In fact, the policies 
implemented by the Assad regime manipulated identity of both groups for realpolitik gains and 
thus they played key role in reproducing sectarian identities and in inciting identity clashes 
                                                          
110For more information about the massacre see “Syria video purport to show new killing in Jadeite Artuz”, 
Hufflingtonpost website, accessed on 8/5/2013, available at:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/syria-
video-massacre-jdeidet-artouz_n_1733591.html  
111“Syria Massacres: Government Reportedly Using Local Militias For Mass Killings”, Huffingtonpost website, 
accessed on 3/5/2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/syria-massacres-
government_n_2851665.html  
112 For samples of such videos see “’idam al-Shabiyyha al-alawiyyn b’d tahrir sraqeb”, (‘The execution of an Alawite 
Shabiha after the liberalization of Saraqeb’), YouTube, accessed on 3/5/2013 available, at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gv7hAJ-1HAU. Also see “’urqusi ya ‘aniaa: ‘idam al qanasa al-alawiyyn  al-
arb’’ fi die al-zour” ,(‘Dance you Anysa’ the execution of four Alawite snipers in Dir al-Zour), YouTube, accessed on 





between Alawites and Sunnis from above. The repercussions of such an approach proved to be 
lethal for all those involved. By inciting Alawites to engage in a warfare with the Sunnis, the 
regime re-ignited the strife between the Alawites and the Sunnis that had been temporarily cooled 
by the thirty-year alliance that Assad senior had established with the Sunni community.  
Furthermore, the chaotic situation, the sectarian behavior of Assad’s forces and the security 
dilemma each allowed the regime to trigger the identity clashes between Sunnis and Alawites from 
above. 
 
1.2. Attempts by anti-Assad Sunni political entrepreneurs to reshape the Sunni identity: 
For many Sunni clergymen, the Syrian uprising endowed them with a chance to reestablish the 
power balance between Sunnis and Alawites. Hence, they took advantage of this highly polarised 
atmosphere to reproduce a particular version of Sunni identity that would eventually ensure their 
dominance. Certainly, the self-reinforcement of Sunni identity acted as a bold provocation to the 
Alawites, and is another factor that contributed to the ignition of identity clashes. All of anti-Assad 
Sunni actors relied upon material and symbolic features to craft a Sunni identity and to strengthen 
their grip on power. The following section examines the reproduction of the primary trends in 
Sunni identity: Sufism, Salafism and Jihadi-Salafism. Throughout the first two years of the 
uprising, each of these identities were competing for hegemony. 
 
1.2.1 The Sufi Identity: 
Sufi identity is considered to be apolitical, as it does not seek the establishment of an Islamic state. 
Rather, it focuses on the role of Islamic principles in regulating society. Notably, since the outset 
of the uprising, the Syrian regime has deployed its longstanding paradigm of divide-and-rule 
politics. Accordingly, the regime pitted the Sufis, Salafis and secularists against each other, which 
consequently intensified the identity clashes.  In short, the Assad regime manipulated Sufi ulama 
like Ramadan al-Buti (d. 2013), a top Sunni preacher, and Ahmed Hassoun, Syria’s Grand Mufti. 
During the uprising, both of these men gave their vocal support to the Assad regime and endorsed 
its agenda. For instance, in March 2013, Hassoun issued a fatwa urging Syrian Muslims to fight 





push their children "towards this duty".113 In fact, Hassoun and Buti’s stances in relation to the 
uprising intensified the cleavages between Sufis on the one hand, and between Sufis and Salafis 
on the other hand. Furthermore, the assassination of Hassoun’s son and of the Buti himself 
increased these cleavages.114 Therefore, the Assad regime adopted its approach of manipulating 
Sunni identity and of fracturing the already fragmented Sunni cliques. With this approach, the 
regime was able to nurture the growth of an anti-Sufi and anti-Alawite brand of Salafism, and to 
spread fears among Sufis that Salafism would become dominant.115 Despite the fact that (as has 
been discussed in chapter two) throughout Syria’s modern history Sufis have occupied a 
hegemonic place in the religious structure and have succeeded in consolidating their access to 
official institutions,116 they were severely weakened by the uprising and lost a great deal of ground 
to their longstanding rivals, the Salafis. Notably, Sufis who were divided in their stances towards 
Assad became increasingly alarmed as Salafis gained momentum and hence they struggled to craft 
a power base from which to oppose the Salafis. Some of the Sufi ulama opted to support Assad, 
while others decided to support the uprising. The following section studies the attempts of two 
influential anti-Assad Sufi sheikhs to reproduce the Sufi identity. The first of these Sheiks is Usama 
Rifai, the eldest son of Sheikh Abdul Karim Rifai (d. 1973), a prominent Damascene figure who 
established religious charitable networks in Damascus some fifty years ago. The second Sheik is 
Kraiyym Rajih, a scholar of Quranic recitation and a former student of Sheikh Hasan Habannaka 
(d. 1978) who, with Abdul Karim Rifai, played an important role in reviving Islamic practice in 
Damascus during the 1960s.117 In essence, Usama Rifai and Kraiyym Rajih represent powerful 
Sufi players who, prior to the uprising, enjoyed a monopoly over Syria’s Sunni realm. During the 
uprising, they sought to empower the Sufi identity over other Sunni identities.  The grassroots 
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support for these clerics stemmed from the Damascene upper and middle-classes, which have a 
strong influence over the kafrsuseh, midan, and malki quarters of Damascus. These are upper- and 
middle-class areas, inhabited mostly by Sunni Damascenes. In the early months of the uprising, 
protests exploded from the mosques where Rifai and Rajih gave their Friday sermons, as both 
clerics were known to express their vocal solidarity with the uprising. For instance, in his Friday 
sermon of July 2011, Usama Rifai criticised the regime’s security solution and highlighted the 
principles of freedom and democracy, calling on Syrians “not [to] fear anyone but the Great 
God”.118 He went on to accuse the regime of manipulating sectarian identities and provoking 
conflict. Rifai denounced the state’s rhetoric and warned of its implications, saying that: 
“[This rhetoric] plays with fire, and who plays with fire will ultimately burn his fingers, and then 
the fire will burn the green and the dry [i.e. everything]”.119 
In essence, Rifai and Rajih relied simultaneously on materialistic and symbolic elements to 
reproduce a Sufi identity for the Sunnis, recalling the principles of Sufism in their discourse and 
citing from the Quran and Hadith. On the other hand, both sheikhs strove to create charitable 
networks and to establish a popular base. Notably, Rifai and Rajih established contact channels 
with anti-Assad protesters, and via these channels both clerics aimed to reinforce a Sufi identity 
that is based on al-Islam al-mu’tadel, a moderate version of Islam. Unlike fundamentalists, Rifai 
and Rajih embodied the Syrian uprising as a popular movement to oust an authoritarian regime 
and not as a religious struggle against the Alawite faith. Neither of them promoted the creation of 
a theocracy. Instead, they advocated democracy, tolerance and nationalism whilst emphasising the 
significance of these norms in Islamic doctrines. Therefore, the Sufi identity that Rifai and Rajih 
were attempting to reinforce seemed more compatible with an inclusive Syrian civic identity than 
the one promoted by Sunni Sheikhs of other schools of thought.  For instance, in a broadcast 
interview, Rifai stressed the importance of pluralism and democracy in post-Assad Syria, claiming 
that: 
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“The Syrian revolution is for all shades of Syrian society […] after the fall of the regime, with God 
willing, sectarianism will be erased from our history”.120 
In another interview, however, Rifai emphasised that Islamists should occupy supreme roles in 
Syrian politics after the uprising: 
“Islamists should be presented because they sacrificed their blood for the revolution while others 
were just watching”.121 
In essence, Sufis were aiming not only to retain the authority over Syria’s Sunni realm that they 
had enjoyed during the Assads’ tenures, but also to upgrade it. Unlike fundamentalists, Sufis did 
not use anti-Alawite discourse, nor did they promote a bellicose rhetoric in relation to secular 
ideologies. Also, unlike Salafis and Jihadis, these clerics were not funded by state or non-state 
actors. Rather, they relied on the Damascene elite (mainly the pious businessmen of haryqa and 
hamidiyya, the main business center in downtown Damascus), their longstanding social 
foundation, to fund their charitable networks that functioned mostly in Damascus and some of its 
suburbs. The main mission of such networks was to distribute humanitarian aid to those affected 
by the crisis, for example funding families of detainees and housing internal refugees. A 26-year-
old activist affiliated with Rifai assured the author that, during the early months of the uprising, 
businessmen of hamidiyya held weekly meetings with Rifai in which they “collected money for 
humanitarian aid and for revolutionary ends”.122 Although, after some six months of the uprising, 
Rifai and Rajih fled to Turkey. Nevertheless, they managed to maintain their contact channels with 
followers in Damascus, mainly with activists in kafrsuseh and midan. According to an anti-Assad 
activist in Kafrsuseh: 
“We are in contact with Rifai. Via telephone, Skype and via Syrian activists in Istanbul, we chat 
about revolutionary affairs. We report the latest to him, and he gives us his thoughts, which we 
certainly took into account”.123 
In this context, Rifai and Rajih utilised social media to promote their logic, and their sermons and 
interviews were regularly posted on the Facebook pages of the kafrsuseh and midan Revolutionary 
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Committees. Yet, unlike Salafis, these Sufi clerics rarely appeared on Satellite TV Channels.  
Besides, although Rifai and Rajih have openly supported jihad and called on all Syrians to fight 
the Assad regime, neither of them established or funded any militias. 124  Notwithstanding, some 
of their followers - mainly youths of kafrsuseh and midan - took up arms, fighting either 
individually or under the umbrella of the FSA. 
 
2.2.1. The Salafi identity: 
Salafism is a strict form of Sunni Islam that seeks to revive al-salaf al-salih, a pure and authentic 
form of Islam. It aims to restructure the state and society in line with Quranic and Sharia law. 
Salafism is hostile “towards other Islamic teachings like Sufism and Shia Islam”.125 As has been 
argued in chapter two, Salafism (unlike Sufism) has a legacy of being suppressed. However, 
Assad’s attempts to upgrade the authoritarian regime catalysed the revival of Salafism. Seemingly, 
the uprising accelerated this revival and set Salafis on a quest for power and legitimacy. Among 
the Salafi Sheiks, the most noticeable in the Damascus suburbs were Sheikh Zahran ‘alloush and 
Sheikh ‘adnan ‘ar’our. These Sheikhs strove to reproduce Sunni identity in accordance with Salafi 
principles, which are hostile to Alawites, whom Salafis regularly dub as kuffar (‘atheists’). Chiefly, 
both Salafi Sheikhs advocated the transformation of Syria into dawla Islamiyya, an Islamic state. 
According to their rhetoric, this transformation could be effected by Jihad. However, these Sheikhs  
confined their interest in Jihad to Syrian politics as, unlike the Salafi-Jihadis, they did not refer to 
Jihad as a global holy war.126 Importantly, these Salafi sheikhs established a social contract with 
the rural middle-class, a social strata that was more frequently subjected to the regime’s 
bombardments than the urban class. By focusing on the activities of ’ar’our and ‘alloush, the 
following section gives an analysis of the Salafi attempts to reproduce a particular version of Sunni 
identity. 
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‘Adnan ‘ar‘our (b. 1948) fled his hometown of Hama to Saudi Arabia in 1982, owing to the 
regime’s oppression of Hama’s Islamist rebellion.   During the 2011 uprising, ‘ar‘our emerged as 
a symbolic figure, and styled himself as its godfather. Mainly, his discourse portrayed the uprising 
as a Sunni movement that sought to achieve religious aims, rather than a popular movement that 
had its roots in a secular ideology of freedom and democracy. In short, ‘ar‘our sought to reinforce 
the Salafi identity by making use of material structure (such as the media and the paramilitary 
wing) and Salafi symbols (such as the Salafi flag and myths).  He regularly appeared on the Salafi 
Satellite TV Channels wisal and shada al-hurriya. During his television appearances, ‘ar‘our made 
anti-Alawite speeches in which he cited Salafi theorists and made rhetorical use of symbols from 
the Salafi tradition, particularly the Salafi flag. In December 2012, for example, ‘ar‘our appeared 
on shada al-hurriya calling on Syrians to write Allah Akbar (‘God is Great’) across the center of 
the revolutionary flag, and to denounce any Syrian who opposed this action as zandyq, ‘a non-
believer’. Interestingly, his calls ignited a wave of anger among anti-Assad secularists, who 
launched a Facebook campaign in response, entitled ana zandyq, ‘I am a non-believer’. 127 
Moreover, in a live aired program on wisal, ’ar’our explicitly threatened to execute each Alawite 
who supported Assad, saying that: 
 
“I swear to God that we would grind the flesh of pro-regime Alawites and feed it to the dogs”.128 
 
Footage of ’ar’our shaking a warning finger at the camera while vowing to kill pro-regime 
Alawites spread throughout the online community. Unsurprisingly, this only acted as fuel to the 
fire of sectarianism. His statement also fragmented the Sunni opposition, with some Sunnis 
praising his vows and others strongly rejecting them.  In late 2012, ’ar’our launched ‘with Syria 
until victory’, a 120-minute weekly program on the shada al-hurriyya TV station, in which he 
discusses religious and revolutionary affairs from a Salafi perspective. In conjunction with his TV 
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program, ’ar’our manipulated social media to reinforce his doctrines, and at the time of writing 
has more than a million followers on Twitter and some 238,200 on his Facebook page. 129 
According to sources on the ground, ’ar’our is supported by state and non-state actors. He has 
secured funds via Salafi networks in Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi Kingdom continues to provide 
him with logistic and political support. 130  ’Ar’our funded militias and charity networks that 
operate mainly in the suburbs of Damascus, particularly with the al-Sahaba militias in the lawan 
area.131 However, his strongest foothold is reportedly in the suburbs of Hama. 
 
The second Salafi actor whose power is flourishing at the time of writing is Sheikh Zahran ‘alloush, 
the leader of Liwa’ al-Islam (‘the Islam Brigade’), the strongest brigade operating in the periphery 
of Damascus. Liwa’ al-Islam is funded by a Salafi lobby in the Gulf States and Iraq.  ‘Alloush 
(who holds a post-graduate degree in Islamic studies from the Islamic University of Saudi Arabia) 
is a former Islamist prisoner, whom the Syrian regime set free in the early months of the uprising. 
Hereafter, he established a base in his hometown of Duma, northern Damascus.132  ‘Alloush used 
a hostile rhetoric towards Alawites, describing them as kuffar atheists and portraying the uprising 
as a holy war against the Alawites. For example, during a graduation ceremony for Islam Brigade 
fighters, ‘alloush stressed that the motivations for the uprising must be purely religious, stating 
that: 
 
“[We] are going to take up arms and to raise our flag [the Salafi flag] to fight for the sake of God 
and to destroy the Kufr ‘(atheism’) and the Kuffar [referring to Alawites]”.133 
 
Moreover, ‘alloush, rarely voiced the word ‘revolution’ or ‘uprising’. Instead, he applied sectarian 
language and Salafi terminology, such as jihad and ghazu (‘struggle’ and ‘invasion’, 
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respectively).134  For instance, in his official page on Twitter, ‘alloush accused Alawites of plotting 
“to massacre the Sunni people”.135  In this light, he utilised communication tools to reinforce Salafi 
identity. Unlike ‘ar‘our, however, he eschewed Salafi TV stations, preferring instead to appear on 
his group’s channels on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. In addition to posting details of its 
military operations and ceremonies, the group channel also uploaded statements by its leader.136   
In February 2013, the Islam Brigade issued a weekly magazine dubbed nida’ al-Islam (‘Islam’s 
call’) that focused mainly on the Brigade’s news. This eight-page magazine employed Salafi 
rhetoric by constantly referring to Islam Brigade fighters as mujahidiyyn, an Islamic term for 
‘strugglers’ or ‘warriors’.137 Moreover, in a column entitled ‘a whisper in mujahid’s ear’, the paper 
published articles that discussed religious affairs from a Salafi logic. One case in point is an article 
entitled ‘obedience’, which stressed one’s religious obligation to obey one’s leaders in the 
battlefield and to obey wlat al-‘umwr (‘the guardians’). The term ‘guardians’ is only vaguely 
defined by the newspaper, however.138 
 
Notably, the Islam Brigade’s biggest stronghold is in Duma, and its followers there are largely 
devout, lower middle-class Sunnis. According to observers, ‘alloush has established a quasi-Salafi 
state in Duma and its surrounding suburbs.139  However, Liwa’ al-Islam’s influence seems to have 
spread beyond Duma, as the Brigade has collaborated with militias operating in the suburbs of 
other towns, such as Sinjar town in Idlib in northwest Syria. Muhannad, a 32-year-old commander 
of the Sinjar Martyrs’ Militia, assured the author that his militia was building a productive alliance 
with Islam Brigade, claiming that: 
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“Our collaboration with Liwa’ al-Islam had fruitful implications for both of us. They [Islam 
Brigade’s fighters] are good Muslims and they are very similar to us”.140 
 
Consequently, ‘alloush’s agenda is not limited to the suburbs of Damascus, but seems to have 
stretched to the rural areas of other cities.  In parallel, ‘alloush is the director of a powerful network 
of charities that function in the suburbs of Damascus and other towns (like Sinjar). This network 
provides fighters’ families with aid, such as food baskets, medicine and cash. Moreover, ‘alloush 
funded educational institutions and religious institutions that teach Salafi doctrines in Duma.141 
 
 
2.2.2. The Salafi-Jihadi identity: 
Salafi-Jihadism is the fundamentalist trend of Salafism that seeks to enforce Islamic order by using 
arms, and which vehemently rejects any secular ideology like democracy and nationalism.142  As 
specialists have observed, the number of Salafi-Jihadi groups mushroomed during the uprising. 
During the first two years of the uprising, the most powerful of these is jabhit al-nusra, or the 
Nusra Front (NF), formed in January 2012 and which, according to observers, is a paramilitary 
organisation with links to al-Qaeda.143 Militarily and logistically speaking, the NF is the solidest 
militia operating in Syria, the identities of its leaders and benefactors remain a mystery.144 It has a 
strong footing in northern Syria, particularly in Idlib and Aleppo, but it also operates in Damascus 
and its suburbs.145 The NF adopted an anti-secular agenda that strove for the establishment of al-
khilafa al-Islamiyya, or Islamic caliphate. Most importantly, unlike the jihad of the Salafis, it 
advocated a global approach to jihad. Since for the NF’s fighters, jihad is not limited to the fight 
against the Assad regime but extends to the global struggle against non-Muslims, imperialism and 
the west. The NF declared its formation on 24 January 2012 with a video clip uploaded to 
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YouTube, in which the NF stated its ultimate objective of “bringing the law of Allah back to his 
land”.146 Essentially, the NF portrayed the Syrian uprising as a religious struggle against the 
Alawites and the Shiites, while strongly denouncing any secular motivations, or drives arising 
from national affiliation. Reportedly, the NF comprised both Syrian and foreign fighters - mainly 
Iraqis, Afghanis and Libyans - who flocked into Syria to participate in the holy jihad.147 The Syrian 
fighters mostly came from lower-classes in the remote areas, such as the town of Binish, north of 
Idlib, and al-hajr al-`aswad, south of Damascus. According to reliable sources on the ground, most 
of the NF’s Syrian fighters were uneducated and unemployed young men (aged between 16 and 
35) who had been dispossessed prior to the uprising and suppressed during it. As a result, their 
association with the NF allowed them to feel empowered.148  Furthermore, the NF deployed 
strategies for building a supportive base among the populace, such as distributing humanitarian 
aids in the areas in which it operated. Also, the NF utilised online social media to spread its rhetoric 
by uploading videos detailing its operations and policies.149 Despite fighting under its banner, not 
all of the NF’s Syrian members agreed with these policies; they were less captivated by the NF’s 
Jihadi ideology than by the efficiency of its military operations.  As a FSA soldier who was fighting 
with the NF stated: 
“NF is an extremely professional paramilitary, it hits the regime in the eyes. I do not agree with 
their agenda or with their sectarian logic, but I want to get rid of Assad. Thus, I’m ready to 




Based on the above account, it seems that during the uprising, anti-Assad political entrepreneurs 
of Sufism, Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism were competing to gain a hegemonic position in post-
Assad Syria. Each of them strove to reproduce a specific version of Sunni identity that would 
provide him with power and legitimacy. Although the versions of Sunni identity that they were 
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attempting to reproduce vary from moderate to extreme, all of them employed a sectarian discourse 
that prioritised explicit adherence to Sunnism, thus helping to incite identity clashes with the 
Alawites. Each of these actors concocted strategies for mobilising his followers and for asserting 
his power over the others. Each strategy, however, was determined by geographic and socio-
economic factors. Sufism, for example, seem sought to assert a modest Sunni identity that 
acknowledged the norms of democracy whilst remaining under the Sunni umbrella. However 
passively, it still embodied the predominance of Sunni identity and accentuated the line between 
Sunnis and Alawites. On the one hand, the Sufis managed to consolidate their power among the 
urban elite and middle-classes, their longstanding allies. Nevertheless, their foothold is fragile in 
comparison with that of the Salafis, as they lack the economic, political and military support that 
the Salafis have secured. On the other hand, Salafis and Salafi-Jihadis strive to reproduce a 
fundamentalist Sunni identity that ignores all secular ideologies like nationalism, and which directs 
a bellicose rhetoric towards the Alawites. Salafis are considered to be more moderate than Salafi-
Jihadis, as the Salafi agenda confines itself to the political sphere within the territorial state, 
whereas the Salafi-Jihadis advocate global jihad. Nevertheless, during the uprising it seemed that 
both groups established a relatively solid footing, with both managing to obtain grassroots support, 
money and military leverage. In this light, Salafis succeeded in mobilising the rural middle-classes 
while the Salafi-Jihadis effectively mobilised the lower-classes in rural and remote areas. 
Interestingly, some forty years ago, these strata had formed the supportive base for the secular 
Ba’ath party. Thanks to Bashar Assad’s economic project that turned them from being supporters 
of secular ideology to advocators of Salafism and Jihadism. However, the repercussions of 
Bashar’s policies also interact with a legacy of hatreds towards the Alawites and the Damascene 
Sufis, since the latter is comprised of the urban bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it is safe to presume 
that the Salafi-Jihadis’ chances of achieving hegemony are limited, as most of Syrian Sunnis tend 
to reject the extremist version of Islamic caliphate, which they perceive to be inapplicable. 
Consequently, Salafism is emerging as a powerful candidate for the support of the rural areas. 
Many rural, middle and lower-class Sunnis perceive Salafism as a legitimate presence that fights 
on the battlefield. By contrast, the legitimacy of Sufism is questionable, as it does not have a 
military presence. Rather, Sufis have a record of association with Assad prior to and during the 
uprising.  Most importantly, Salafism seems to pave the way for rural Sunnis to enter Syria’s 





the Attasis of Homs and the Quatlis of Damascus. In the Ba’athist republic, Syrian politics was 
dominated by minority groups, mainly the Alawites, Druze and Ismail’is. Although many rural 
Sunnis were empowered by the Ba’athist system during Hafez Assad’s tenure, only a few of them 
acquired high-rank positions in the Ba’ath apparatus. Among these were the former Defense 
Minister Mustafa Tllas and the former Vice President Abdul-Halim Khaddam. Under Bashar 
Assad, however, powerful rural Ba’athists were marginalised. As a result, the key political 











1.3 The Shiite axis vs. the Sunni bloc: reproducing Sunni and Alawite identities from 
beyond the Syrian borders: 
 
Given Syria’s geostrategic position and her potential as a regional actor, it is unsurprising that the 
repercussions of the uprising reach beyond the borders of the Syrian territories. A radical change 
in Damascus would catalyse a drastic shift in the balance of the regional system and jeopardise the 
stability of all contiguous actors. Therefore, since the onset of the uprising regional actors have 
been striving to minimise the risks while seeking out realpolitik gains. Both the Sunni and the 
Alawite identity acted as vital instruments in the hands of regional actors vying for power. 
Unquestionably, this helped to inflame identity clashes. The policies of the so-called ‘Shiite axis’ 
(comprised of Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah) and those of the ‘Sunni-bloc’ (represented mainly by some 





player sought to empower an identity group over the others by advancing political, economic and 
military support. This gave a sectarian trajectory to the Syrian uprising, and characterised it as a 
Sunni versus Shiite holy struggle.  The first part of this section examines the effects of the rhetoric 
employed by Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah while the second part assesses the role of non-Syrian, Sunni 
political entrepreneurs who, supported by the Sunni bloc, helped to incite identity clashes from 
above. 
In essence, the intimate involvement of Iran and Hezbollah had been acknowledged since the very 
beginning of the uprising, as both actors have openly and fervently backed the Syrian regime. 
Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this section to examine whether their motivations have 
ideological roots or are limited to realpolitik ends. Certainly, the Syrian regime’s survival is critical 
to Iran’s power and, moreover, to Hezbollah’s de facto existence. This is owing to the fact that 
Syria has long been a potent ally for both actors, as well as a conduit for providing weapons to 
Hezbollah. Therefore, Iran and Hezbollah struggled to defend their embroiled ally, and supplied 
the Assad regime with comprehensive political and military support. Furthermore, Hezbollah and 
Iranian fighters were shadowing the regime’s forces in some sectarian mixed areas, mainly in the 
suburbs of Homs, which fueled the Sunni versus Alawite identity clashes.151 This led to the FSA’s 
capture in August 2012 of 48 Iranians who, according to the Syrian opposition, were members of 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Meanwhile, Iranian official sources claimed that these were 
pious Shiite pilgrims. This kidnapping incident heightened the sectarian tensions, as it positioned 
Shiite and Alawite identity at the odds with Sunni identity. Many anti-Assad Sunnis interviewed 
by the author portrayed these Iranian hostages as representatives of Alawite identity seeking to 
dominate the Sunni identity. Abdullah, an anti-Assad Sunni of Homs, summarises this perspective 
as follow: 
“These Iranians are Shiite fighters, they are representing a Shiite theocracy allied to an Alawite 
regime. They came to Syria in order to empower their Alawite allies and to weaken the Sunnis”.152 
In January 2013, the Iranian detainees were released under a Turkish-sponsored deal, by which the 
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Syrian regime freed some 2000 anti-Assad protesters.153 The Syrian State TV broadcasted footage 
of Iranian officials in Damascus giving a heroic welcome to the released hostages. In the eyes of 
many Syrian Sunnis, this cast doubt on the fact that these Iranians were ordinary pilgrims, thus 
emphasising the sectarian nature of the kidnapping. 
 In a similar vein, Mehdi Taeb, a Senior Iranian cleric, inflamed sectarian resentment in February 
2013 by declaring Syria as an essential province of Iran: 
“Syria is the 35th province [of Iran] and a strategic province for us. If the enemy attacks us and 
wants to take either Syria or Khuzestan [in western Iran], the priority for us is to keep Syria. If we 
keep Syria, we can get Khuzestan back too; but if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran”.154 
Taeb’s statement dominated the news bulletins and fueled the Alawite versus Sunni identity 
clashes, since it was perceived by many Sunnis as a clear indicator of the “Shiite-Alawite alliance 
against the Sunnis”.155 For many Alawites, on the other hand, this statement strengthened their 
stance in relation to the Sunnis. According to Aseel, a 26 year-old Alawite of Damascus: 
“Taeb’s declaration assures that they will defend us against them until the end”.156 
Paralleling Iran’s rhetoric is the official discourse by Hezbollah leader, Hasan Nassrallah. His 
discourse seems to have intensified the identity clashes as, since the  beginning of the uprising, he 
has expressed a steadfast commitment to the Syrian regime and portrayed the popular movement 
as a conspiracy against the so called ‘resistance axis’.157 Although Nassrallah denied there being 
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any physical presence of his party in Syria during the first two years of the uprising, nevertheless, 
he declared that Syrian Shiites in villages on the border with Lebanon “took up arms to protect 
themselves from the armed-gangs there [in reference to the Sunni militias]”.158 With this statement, 
Nassrallah voiced Hezbollah’s solidarity with the Shiite identity in its struggle against the Sunni 
identity, hence accelerating the sectarian narrative.  Notably, Nassrallah’s approach towards the 
uprising resulted in a radical decline in his popularity among most Syrians, who for two decades 
had regarded Nassrallah as a national hero. Yet, during the uprising, the cross-sectarian legitimacy 
that Nassrallah once used to enjoy was destroyed, and his status as a national hero turned to that 
of a Shiite enemy.159 As a Sunni resident of Damascus expressed: 
“Nassrallah is backing Assad because a Shiite would support an Alawite and not a Sunni. 
Resistance is only a cover for Hezbollah sectarian ends”.160 
In this context, the discourse of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Noury Maliki, seems to overlap with Iran 
and Hezbollah’s approaches toward the uprising. In the eruption of the uprising, Maliki expressed 
his vocal support for the Syrian regime. As he belongs to the Shiite identity group and is the leader 
of a government that is considered to be part of the Shiite axis, Maliki’s stances were framed in a 
Shiite and Alawite versus Sunni perspective. Moreover, in a controversial statement, Maliki 
emphasised the sectarian nature of the uprising that, in his words, forced the Alawites in Syria to 
fight “bravely by their men and by their women in order to survive”. 161 Certainly, such a 
commentary indicated the sectarian grounding of Maliki’s attitudes towards the uprising, and 
heightened the tension between Alawites and Sunnis by reproducing the Alawite identity as an 
endangered species fighting for its survival. Besides, although Maliki opted not to intervene 
militarily in Syria, the Iraqi forces at the border areas provided a defensive cover for the Syrian 
regime. For example, in the early months of 2013, sporadic clashes were reported to have occurred 
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between anti-Assad militants and the Iraqi troops safeguarding Assad’s forces. 162  Notably, 
sectarian tension extended to the fragile Iraq in late 2012, when Iraq's Shiite-led government faced 
several protests from Sunnis angered by perceived discrimination. The protests erupted from the 
Sunni stronghold of Falluja and rapidly spread to other Sunni Arab areas of Iraq.163 Some Syrian 
Sunni rebels praised these ‘anti-Shiite’ demonstrations in Iraq and linked them to the Syrian 
uprising. For instance, anti-Assad activists proposed Souriyya wa al-Iraq: thawra tutfi’ nar al-
majows (‘Syria and Iraq: a revolution that will quench the fire of the Magi’ [in reference to the 
Shiites and to the Alawites]) as the title for the 8th of March protest in Syria.164 Certainly, such 
affiliation projected the uprising as a Sunni war against the Alawites and the Shiites. Moreover, in 
late 2012, Lebanese and Iraqi Shiite soldiers co-founded abu al-fadil al-abbas, a brigade for 
protecting the Shiite holy Shrine of Saiyyda Zainab on the edges of Damascus against a possible 
attack from “Sunni rebels”. 165  Sources on the ground assured that, although the brigade is 
supervised by Hezbollah commanders, it is also comprised of Lebanese and Iraqi Shiite soldiers.  
The Brigade has a page on Facebook, which issued the identity of its non-Syrian killed soldiers 
and uploaded videos of its fighters chanting Shiite slogans and vowing to attack the anti-Assad 
Sunnis.166 Regardless of the authenticity of such videos, they contributed significantly to inciting 
identity clashes and providing anti-Assad Sunni political entrepreneurs with a further tool for 
effecting radicalisation. 
On the other hand, political, economic and militarily support given to the Syrian Sunni rebels by 
Turkey and some of the Gulf states heightened the sectarian narrative and seemed to instigate 
identity clashes, since their involvement was portrayed as part of a broader struggle against the 
Shiite axis in the region. In fact, each of these players exploited Sunni identity by empowering 
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Sunni-dominated factions of the opposition against pro-Assad forces dominated by Alawites and 
supported by the Shiite axis. Equally important is the media coverage of the Gulf States, such as 
Al-Jazeera Satellite TV network in Qatar and the Al-Arabiya Satellite TV network in Saudi Arabia. 
These networks broadcast this sectarian logic and henceforth played integral roles in reproducing 
sectarian identities.167  In parallel, non-Syrian Salafi Sheikhs who were supported by some Gulf 
States played crucial roles in triggering identity clashes, since they characterised the uprising as 
an anti-Alawite and anti-Shiite movement. Some examples of these Sheikhs are: 
 
A. Sheikh Ahmed Asyr of Lebanon: 
A Salafi cleric based in Sidon in southern Lebanon, he emerged during the Syrian uprising as a 
problematic figure who endorsed anti-Shiite and anti-Alawite logic. In his discourse, Asyr 
described the uprising as a fight for “existence”168 between the Shiites and the Sunnis in the region.  
He organised a myriad of anti-Assad rallies in Sunni areas of Lebanon, where he frequently 
delivered rabblerousing statements. For instance, in one of his speeches, Asyr accused Hezbollah 
of attacking Sunnis in Syria: 
“Hezbollah is sending his soldiers to kill our [Sunnis] siblings and to rape our women”.169 
In essence, Asyr strove to link the uprising in Syria with his struggle against Hezbollah control 
over Lebanon. Hence, his speeches and statements stressed that Syrian rebels were fighting against 
the Alawite and Shiite hegemony in Syria and Lebanon. For example, in a televised interview, 
Asir warned Nassrallah that Sunnis of Syria and Lebanon would “redress the power balance in 
Lebanon”. 170  Notably, Asyr’s speeches and sermons were aired live by some Lebanese TV 
channels, and were uploaded to a website sponsored by him. Indeed, Asyr gained momentum 
among some anti-Assad Syrian Sunnis, who circulated his commentaries on social networks. 
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Furthermore, as a gesture for appreciation, Syrian Sunni rebels named a militia after him.171 It is 
also worth noting that Asyr is funded by Salafi networks based in Lebanon and in Saudi Arabia. 
He also runs a charity network that supplies humanitarian aid to Syrian Sunnis who took refuge in 
Lebanon, and that supplied light weaponry to Sunni militants in the suburbs of Homs.172 
 
B. Nabil al-‘audy of Kuwait: 
Al-‘audy is a charismatic Salafi cleric, who regularly appeared on Salafi TV Channels while 
accusing the Assad regime of targeting the Sunni community in Syria.  He used sectarian language 
in which he often cited Ibn Taimiyya, a medieval scholar (d. 1328) who issued the controversial 
declaration that Alawites are murtadon (‘apostates’).173  In one of his sermons, al-‘audy accused 
Iran and Hezbollah of causing the violence in Syria, and went on to call on the leaders of the Gulf 
States to arm anti-Assad Sunnis: 
“Those who fight in Syria are the party of devil [referring to Hezbollah], and the militias of Mahdi. 
Iran is fighting against us [Sunnis] so either you [Gulf Leaders] send your armies [to Syria], or you 
should arm the FSA. Otherwise, all of you are traitors”.174 
Chiefly, al-‘audy projected the Syrian uprising as a holy war against the Shiite threat. In a televised 
sermon, he praised Syrian Sunni militants for confronting the Shiite agenda: 
“Syrian Sunni rebels are facing the biggest and the most dangerous project to the Islamic Uma 
[which is] the project of Safavid [in reference to Shiites]”.175 
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Remarkably, al-‘audy obtained a large following among some Syrian Sunni activists, who 
dedicated a Facebook page to him, dubbed ‘a million Syrians with the voice of justice: sheikh 
Mohamed al-‘audy’. Al-‘audy’s sermons and interviews were often posted on this page. 176 
Moreover, he is the director of a charitable association funded by Salafi networks in Kuwait, the 
same association that supplied weapons to Sunni rebels in Syria and endowed Syrian refugees in 
Turkey with social services.177 
 
C. Mohamed al-‘uraify of Saudi Arabia; 
Al-‘uraify is a Salafi preacher who hosts a popular 90-minute TV program entitled ‘put in your 
fingerprint’, which is broadcast on the Salafi TV channel Iqra’ (‘read’). In his broadcasts, he 
portrayed the Syrian uprising as a jihad against the Alawites and the Shiites. 178 Notably, he is 
based in the Saudi capital, from where he directs a charitable network that provided Sunni rebels 
with light weaponry. In addition, al-‘uraify distributed humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees, 
particularly in Jordan, which he visited several times to deliver sermons and cash money.179   
Indeed, al-‘uraify’s anti-Alawite rhetoric was admired by some Syrian Sunni rebels, who 
frequently circulated his statements on the social media. 
Summary: 
 
On the basis of the above account, it can be asserted that external actors played integral roles in 
constructing Sunni versus Alawite identity clashes from above. On the one hand, the vocal and 
visible support that the Shiite axis gave to the Syrian regime reproduced the Alawite identity and 
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triggered the subsequent backlash from the Sunnis. For many Sunnis, these actors were perceived 
as backing the Alawites against the Sunni rebels, since the fall of the Assad regime would fracture 
the Shiite axis and empower the Sunni bloc. As a result, these actors’ intervention was placed in 
the broader picture of the struggle between Sunnis and Shiites for regional power.  Consequently, 
this bolstered sectarian and transnational affiliations. On the other hand, the political, economic 
and militarily support that Sunni state actors gave to the Sunni rebels reinforced the Alawite 
identity and directed it against the Sunnis. From an Alawite perspective, these actors were striving 
to erode the Alawite identity and to make the Sunni identity dominant in the region. Moreover, the 
anti-Alawite discourse used by non-Syrian Sunni political entrepreneurs helped to incite identity 
clashes, as each of them sought to reinforce the Sunni identity against the Alawite identity. This 
characterised the struggle as being crucial to the survival of each identity group.  Importantly, all 
these actors deployed material structures (by using charitable networks, media and arms), and 
symbolic factors (by citing from Ibn Taimiyya’s texts and emphasising the importance of holy 
shrines), to reproduce identities and to steer the uprising in a more sectarian direction. 
In sum, state and non-state external actors manipulated sectarian identities for their struggle in and 
for Syria. Despite being outsiders, they seem to be capable of redrawing the ethnic boundaries 
inside Syria. Their discourses played pivotal roles in prioritising sectarian sentiment over national 
affiliation and henceforth producing transnational affiliation by which a Syrian Sunni might 
associate his or her identity with a Saudi Sunni fighting against a Syrian Alawite. Equally, a Syrian 
Alawite may feel an affinity with a Shiite Lebanese fighting against a Syrian Sunni. 
 
 
2. Sunni identity vs. Alawite identity: the reproduction from below: 
This section attempts to prove that identity clashes are not simply manufactured from above. 
Symbols and myths also operate at the grassroots level, and their symbolic power is unleashed 
when the security dilemma reaches a crisis. In this way, they are powerful to reproduce particular 
identity and to igniting identity clashes from below. Sectarian symbols, slogans, songs and jokes 
highlight the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, reinforcing identities and inciting clashes 





explicitly inciting identity clashes, since they conveyed anti-Alawite sentiment. The most 
controversial example is the Sunni vow to cleanse Syria of Alawites: al-alwiyyah la al-qubour w 
al-masiyhyyah la Beirut, ‘Alawites to graves and Christians to Beirut’. Another similar example 
is bidna nbyd al-alwiyyah, ‘we want to massacre the Alawites’.180 These slogans were sung by 
some anti-Assad Sunnis and began to be expressed around the fifth month of the uprising. 
Unsurprisingly, they elicited collective responses of anger and fear among the Alawites.  An anti-
Assad Alawite activist assured that this slogan was voiced during a protest in which she was taking 
part in the town of Yabroud, north of Damascus: 
“We were chanting ‘the people want to overthrow the regime’, and then suddenly, couple of 
protesters yelled ‘we want to massacre the Alawites’. Rapidly, the rest of the protesters reiterated 
this slogan. I stood aside while watching the crowd. I felt afraid about my future and about Syria’s 
future”.181 
Likewise, slogans that represent Alawite identity were often associated with Bashar Assad, as they 
vow loyalty to his cause. A widely repeated slogan says: Shabiyyha lil abad la‘ajl ‘aywnak ya 
Assad ‘[we will remain] Shabiyyha forever, for your eyes oh Assad’. A similar one says: ya Bashar 
la tihtam ‘andak sh’ab byshrab dam (‘Oh Bashar, do not care, you have people who drink 
blood’).182 These slogans were mostly repeated by forces loyal to the Assad regime that, as this 
chapter discussed, were predominated by Alawites. However, importantly, they were also chanted 
by pro-Assad Syrians, who flaunted indicators of their communal belonging, such as the Zulfiqar 
sword and the Alawite accent. 183 In parallel, flags that were waved by each identity group 
reproduced sectarian identities and generated clashes, since they visibly advocated particular 
identity over the others. For example, the black flag emblazoned with Arabic script that reads, 
‘there is no God but God’, refers to a Salafi-Jihadi identity, and was usually flown by Sunni rebels 
while they chanted al-sh’ab yuryd al-khilafa Islamiyya, ‘the people want the establishment of an 
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Islamic Caliphate’.184 Similarly, the green or the white flag with the same writing is associated 
with the Salafis, and was often fluttered by Sunni rebels chanting Islamic slogans, like hiz kaffak 
hizw haz dyn Mohamed klu ‘izz (‘shake your hand, shake it, the religion of Mohamed is full of 
glory”), and qa’idna li al-abad saydna Mohamed (‘Our leader forever is our prophet 
Mohamed’).185 In this context, anti-Shiite slogans were also chanted by some Sunni rebels, a prime 
example says la Iran w la Hezbollah, bidna Muslim ykhaf Allah, ‘neither Iran nor Hezbollah, we 
want a Muslim who fears God’.186  On the other hand, slogans against the Sunni bloc were 
commonly shouted during pro-Assad rallies. One popular anti-Qatari slogan runs: il ma bysafi’.. 
‘amu qatariyya, ‘you are a son of a Qatari if you do not applaud’. Another slogan says: bi saraha 
w ‘al makshouf ‘ikhwanji ma bedna nshouf, ‘frankly and openly, we do not want to see any member 
of the Muslim brotherhood’.187 Seen in this light, the regime’s forces (particularly Shabiyyha) 
attached the Syrian flag to portraits of Assad while writing anti-Islamist and anti-uprising graffiti, 
such as la ‘ilah ila Bashar (‘No God but Bashar’), al Assad aw la ahad (‘either Assad or no one’) 
and al-Assad aw nahriq al-balad (‘either Assad or we will burn the country’).188 Such graffiti 
directly linked the fate of the Alawites to that of Bashar Assad and, henceforth, characterised the 
Alawite identity as an endangered identity group, struggling for its survival against the Sunnis.189 
Indeed, the use of such sectarian discourse by both identity groups created audible and visual 
provocations, and played a crucial role in reinforcing Alawite and Sunni identities against each 
other. 
Equally important in inciting identity clashes between these groups was the sectarian language 
adopted by a number of anti-Assad Sunnis.  Some examples of this language are the sectarian 
names referring to militias, commanders and military operations. These names evoke Sunni 
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symbols, such as the Sunni Hawks Militia and the Ibn Taimiyya Battalions. In addition, many 
Sunni internet activists refer to Alawites as qurud al-jabal (‘monkeys of the mountain’), which 
recalls the Alawites’ history as a persecuted group. Also, they often referred to Alawite districts 
as mustawtanat al-‘alawiyya,’ (‘the Alawite settlements’). This sectarian discourse served to 
spread anti-Alawite sentiment, and to depict the Alawites as outsiders. On the other hand, some 
Alawites described Sunnis as ’ara’iyr in reference to ‘adnan ‘ar’our, the anti-Assad Salafi cleric. 
Moreover, each identity group tended to dub the corpses of other group members as fataiyys, which 
translates literally as ‘the dead animals’. 
In this context, a pivotal source of sectarian provocation operating at the grassroots level was the 
songs created by Sunni rebels throughout the uprising. The most radical examples are two popular 
jihadi songs that were first sung in Idlib. The first is named: shurta nusayriyya (‘nussayri police’). 
A brief of the song is as follow: 
“Oh Alawites wait, we are going to slaughter you without an agreement. They say that I am a 
terrorist; I’m honored, I replied […]’.190 
The second song expresses the uprising as an anti-Alawite fight, it says:  “Oh you listen Bashar 
[Assad], Sunni people revolted, opened fire on Shabiyyha and murdered them”.191 
Likewise, from the onset of the uprising many Alawite singers produced pro-Assad songs that 
were commonly sung during pro-Assad demonstrations and car rallies. In these car rallies, Alawite 
youths drive their tinted-windowed Mercedes and Range Rovers displaying pictures of Assad and 
the Zulfiqar sword. Playing these songs at high volume, the youths cruise around the upmarket 
districts of Damascus, such as malki and abu-rummanah.192 It should be noted that Damascenes 
would have known that these were Alawite youths, as they largely came from Alawite elite in 
Damascus, such like those of Ismail, Ibrahim and Suliman families. Hence, all of the components 
(the songs, singers, pictures and the people displaying them) were associated with Alawite identity 
and were seen as reinforcing it. One example of these songs is the one by Ali al-Dyk, which says 
“Oh Bashar [Assad] whatever happens […] we shall remain your soldiers”. Interestingly, in the 
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middle of this song, there is a soundbite of Hassan Nassrallah saying “life for Syria’s Assad”.193 
A second example is a song by Wafiq Habib that runs: “Oh Bashar do not care, Syria is with 
you”.194 A final example is a song by Hussein al-Dyk, that says: “Syria is fine and our leader is 
fine, […]. Oh Bashar your army is protecting the house”.195 
In addition to the sectarian slogans, language, graffiti and songs that triggered the Alawite versus 
Sunni identity clashes, many sectarian jokes were circulated amongst Syrians, which bolstered 
communal affiliations at the grassroots level. The following are some examples: 
 
‘An Alawite asks a Sunni angrily: Why do they claim that we have sectarianism in Syria? 
We do not have sectarianism at all, because in Syria there is only one sect; the Alawites.’ 
‘A Sunni tells an Alawite, I can assure you a hundred percent that all Alawites will be 
treated fairly after the uprising. All of them will be sent back to their mountains to collect 
olives’. 196 
‘How beautiful is the religious coexistence that we have in Syria. We have a mosque for 
Muslims, next to a church for Christians and just next to them stands a security branch for 
the Alawites’. 
By using sarcasm and irony, theses jokes address anti-Alawite and Anti-Sunni affiliations and 
reproduce the sectarian identity of each group. In summary, symbols, songs, slogans, graffiti and 
jokes that express support or enmity for the Sunni or Alawite identity groups played a crucial role 
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Based on the above account, it seems that throughout the first two years of the uprising, identity 
clashes between Sunnis and Alawites were provoked by internal and external actors, and by 
material and symbolic factors. The interaction between sectarian discourses directed from above 
and from below established the necessary context for the outbreak of identity clashes between 
these groups. Seemingly, the Assad regime’s security and military solutions posed lethal 
implications for both the Alawite and the Sunni identities. By pitting Alawite-dominated forces 
against Sunni rebels, the regime reproduced the Alawite identity and provoked sectarian action by 
the Sunnis. This served to embody the uprising as a sectarian fight per se. Furthermore, it linked 
Assad’s survival to that of the Alawites themselves. Besides, the sectarian actions of loyalist forces 
and the security dilemma that affected both identity groups played essential roles in fueling the 
identity clashes. In addition, by manipulating the Sufi identity, the regime revived Salafism, which 
brought out a radical streak in Sunni identity. Meanwhile, anti-Assad Syrian Sunni political 
entrepreneurs utilised material structures (media, arms and charitable networks), and symbolic 
features (the adoption of a particular flag and the projection of discourse invoking Syrian myths, 
such as the citations from Ibn Taimiyya’s works) in their attempts to advance a particular version 
of Sunni identity, hence playing a pivotal role in provoking Sunnis against the Alawites. Likewise, 
external state and non-state actors manipulated identities for realpolitik gains, and in doing so also 
pitted the Alawite identity against the Sunni identity, inciting the clashes using a top-down 
approach. Paralleling this discourse manufactured from above, symbolic elements referring to a 
specific identity group triggered the clashes from below, since they influentially stressed the ethnic 





and Sunnis led both parties to believe that they were fighting for their survival, accelerating the 







The Kurdish identity; from banishment to empowerment 
The Kurdish question adds a problematic dimension to the identity dilemma in Syria that exploded 
with the uprising.  Unsurprisingly, the uprising provided a window of opportunities for the Kurds 
in Syria to achieve their objectives, which varied from moderate to radical. Like other factions of 
the Syrian society, the Kurds did not represent a monolithic clique, nor did they endorse a united 
agenda. Instead, they were subjected to a continuous process of fragmentation. In this light, the 
Kurdish identity also seems to have been subjected to a drastic process of reproduction by state 
and non-state political entrepreneurs, who employed materialistic and symbolic features to craft 
an identity that would facilitate their rule. This chapter analyses the various aspects of this process. 
The first section examines the role of the Syrian regime and the Kurdish political entrepreneurs in 
the reproduction of Kurdish identity from above. This is followed by a study of the involvement 
of external state and non-state actors (namely, those in Turkey and Iraq) in reproducing the Kurdish 
identity. The second section studies the role of symbolic features in reconstructing the Kurdish 
identity and in inflaming identity clashes from a bottom-up approach. 
 





1.1. The Syrian regime rapprochement with the Kurds 
Fundamentally, the troubled Syrian regime strove to discourage the Kurdish identity group from 
joining the rebellion. Thus, from the onset of the uprising, the regime attempted to inveigle the 
Kurds into trusting it by turning a blind eye to all revolutionary activities in the Kurdish enclaves, 
and by allowing anti-Assad Kurds to operate there without punishment. Many anti-Assad Kurds 
interviewed by the author in Syria, assured that the regime’s security services in Kurdish areas 
were aware that anti-Assad activities were taking place, during the early days of the uprising, yet 
they opted to ignore it. According to Hamber, a 26 year-old anti-Assad Kurd from Qamishli: 
“during the first months of the uprising, we [the Kurdish youth] were protesting while displaying 
revolutionary flags and chanting anti-Assad slogans right in front of the regime’s security services, 
who totally ignored us. Not a single bullet was fired against us”.197 
In essence, the Assad regime adopted a policy of containment in relation to the Kurds. In the first 
place, only one month after the uprising, a governmental grant of citizenship was issued to 
thousands of Kurds in northern Syria who (as has been discussed in Chapter Two) had been 
deprived of this right for decades.198 Secondly and more importantly, the regime formed an indirect 
alliance with a key Kurdish player, the Democratic Union Party or the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat 
(PYD) in Kurdish.199 In accordance with this alliance, in July 2012 Assad’s forces completely 
withdrew from Kurdish areas and henceforth granted the Kurds a quasi-autonomy, in which the 
PYD was allowed to fill the political and security vacuums. Seemingly, this boosted the PYD’s 
power over other players.200 The regime’s logic behind this realpolitik strategy was twofold. First 
and foremost, the regime wished to contain the Kurdish threat. Secondly, the alliance was made in 
an attempt to fragment the opposition, as it encouraged the growth of faction not just amongst 
Kurds themselves, but between Kurds and Arabs as well. Another motive for the regime’s 
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empowerment of the PYD was to challenge Turkey, since the PYD which is now functioning 
across the southern Turkish border, has long been a thorn in Turkey’s side.   Consequently, the 
regime’s rhetoric manipulated the Kurdish identity, as it pitted it against Arab identity and 
inflamed identity clashes on a top-down approach. Furthermore, as the following sections argue, 
the regime discourse interplays with discourses by Kurdish political entrepreneurs and also with 
discourses at the grassroots level in redrawing ethnic boundaries between Arab and Kurdish 
identity groups. 
 
1.2. Attempts by Kurdish political entrepreneurs to reproduce Kurdish identity 
In the outbreak of the uprising, three actors emerged as key players struggling to gain a foothold 
in the Kurdish political theater.  However, their power differs according to economic, social and 
geographic factors. Each of them sought to promote a different version of Kurdish identity by 
exploiting materialistic and symbolic elements. These players are: 1) – the PYD, a Syrian Kurdish 
branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), 2) -  the Kurdish 
National Council (KNC), a coalition of Kurdish leftist parties, and 3) - the Union of Kurdish Youth 
Committees in Syria (UKYC), an umbrella opposition group that includes all Kurdish 
revolutionary youth movements. Indeed, the first two actors constitute the old guard of the Kurdish 
opposition, whilst the UKYC represents what this thesis considers to be the new guard of the 
Syrian secular opposition. As this section argues, three of these actors played crucial roles in 
reproducing Kurdish identity from above. 
1.2.1 The PYD: an emerging hegemony? 
Although the Syrian regime’s policies towards the PYD deprived the later off appearing legitimate 
in the eyes of many Syrian Arabs and some Kurds, the PYD nevertheless succeeded in establishing 
itself as the “most powerful Kurdish player”.201 The PYD was founded in 2003 by PKK militants 
of Syrian origin in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Subsequently, the party came to be 
                                                          





ideologically and militarily affiliated with the PKK.202 Mainly, the PYD’s rhetoric prioritises an 
affiliation with Kurdistan over an affiliation with the Syrian state, and advocates the creation of 
‘Western Kurdistan’ [referring to the Kurdish enclaves in northeast Syria] as an autonomous state 
in a federal structure. The PYD’s constitution states that the party adheres to “federalization since 
it indicates the most appropriate solution for Kurds in Western Kurdistan”.203  However, the 
constitution rejects territorial separation, and emphasises that Western Kurdistan should exist 
within a “free democratic Syria”. In this vein, Saleh Muslim, (leader of the PYD since 2010), gave 
general summary of the PYD’s standpoint in relation to the separation of the Syrian state: 
“The PYD believes that the Kurdish areas are part of Greater Syria, and hence we seek to 
collaborate with our partners in this country and to establish a democratic system in which Kurds 
can enjoy their rights. We do not seek liberation, but are determined to govern our own affairs by 
ourselves”.204 
However, experts argue that the intimate ties between the PKK and the PYD illustrate the PYD’s 
secessionist aspirations, and the latter has been accused of intangibly defining the concept of 
autonomy.205 Moreover, the PYD openly shares the PKK’s ideology, and echoes its political 
phraseology of ‘democratic autonomy’. The PKK and the PYD share a common objective of 
producing a transnational identity that belongs to Kurdistan and not to the Syrian territorial state.206 
In order to craft such an identity, the PYD has striven, since the early days of the uprising, to 
establish a power triangle composed of arms, money and a supportive base. In fact, as observers 
on the ground have assured, the PYD has successfully created this triangle thanks to the logistic 
support of the Syrian regime and to the PKK’s funding.207 At the head of this triangle is the Popular 
Protection Unit or the Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG). This is the PYD’s paramilitary wing that 
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consists of some 10,000 well-trained fighters, most of whom are former PKK fighters of Syrian 
origin who entered Syria from neighboring Turkey. The YPG is the strongest militia functioning 
in the Kurdish areas, and it has filled the vacuum left by the regime’s forces.208 Its main mission 
is to secure the Kurdish zones, monitor the borders with Iraq and Turkey and most importantly, to 
thwart the attempts of any rivals to take power. Yet, in the eyes of many Syrian Arabs and of some 
Kurds, the YPG lacked legitimacy and was perceived as being a proxy for the regime.209 
Paralleling this military power, the PYD formed the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan 
(PCWK), which is an institutional body that delivers social services to the Kurdish areas, and 
which supplies humanitarian aid to those in need. Also, the PCWK established schools and centres 
that focus on teaching the Kurdish language, and on restoring the original Kurdish names to towns, 
cities and villages in the Syrian Kurdish areas.210 In other words, the PCWK’s main aim is to 
reinforce the Kurdish identity of the Kurdish areas in Syria. In fact, many Syrian Kurds interviewed 
by the author affirmed that the PCWK have widened the support base of the PYD, as it answered 
the need of the people efficiently given the absence of state institutions.  As a Syrian Kurd of 
Dirbasiyya eloquently summarised: 
“The PCWK deals successfully with day-to-day needs, by providing things like fuel, gas and flour 
to Kurdish people, especially in the remote areas. Although I do not agree with the PYD’s logic, 
practically speaking it succeeded in governing the Kurdish affairs during the hard circumstances 
of the uprising. If an election is to take place among the Kurds now, I can assure you that the PYD 
would win 100% of the votes”. 211  Hence, through this material structure which comprises 
charitable network and military wing, the PYD managed to secure the third corner of its power 
triangle: the supportive base. Forming a large part of this supportive base are the rural, lower-
middle class areas such like Jarabulus and Dyriyyk of al-Hassaka.212 
Against this backdrop, security dilemma seems to interact with discourses directed from above and 
to consequently reproduce the Kurdish identity.  Indeed, Arab-Kurd confrontations were reported 
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for several weeks in January 2013 in Ras al-ayn town (‘Serê Kaniyê’ in Kurdish) on the Turkish 
border, when militias affiliated with the NF raided the town and killed several members of the 
YPG. Reportedly, the Jihadist militias staged the attack against the PYD, since they consider it as 
a proxy for the Syrian regime. The fighting escalated briskly as more Jihadi militias crossed the 
border from Turkey.213 Although a ceasefire was declared a few weeks later, tensions remained 
high. As a result, fear and chaos spread among other Kurdish towns which, after the clashes, had 
a renewed sense of gratitude towards the military wing of the PYD which protected them from 
their Arab fellows.214 The clashes, therefore, seem to have emphasised the Kurdish identity, and 
enhanced the PYD’s popularity. Serdar, a Kurdish Syrian Journalist of Serê Kaniyê, summarised 
the implications of these clashes for Kurds: 
“The clashes gave the PYD a heroic role, as many Kurds perceived that the PYD had defended 
them from attacks by radical Arab militias, and that hereafter it will safeguard their existence 
throughout the chaotic and insecure situation that is currently unfolding, and which is to continue 
in the post-Assad era. Prior to the clashes, the PYD was not popular among residents of Serê 
Kaniyê, who were leaning more towards the KNC. But now, all of them support it. In their eyes, 
PYD is protecting them, as well as addressing their daily needs. It gives them security and 
bread”.215  
In essence, the PYD injected a strong Kurdish subtext to its rhetoric and activities, and manipulated 
symbols from Kurdish history in order to reinforce the Kurdish identity using a top-down 
approach. For instance, portraits of the PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan (an icon for Kurdish 
nationalism) were constantly displayed during rallies organised by the PYD, and the script on the 
banners was mostly written in Kurdish. Other features of PYD mass rallies utilised Kurdish 
symbols, such as traditional customs and music. Furthermore, the Kurdish and the party flags were 
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the only flags waved, the revolutionary flag was not acknowledged.216 In this respect, the PYD’s 
modus operandi seemed to accord with its agenda without paralleling the nation-wide uprising. 
Importantly, the PYD constructed its own communication tools for promoting its logic. For 
instance, it has a website that publishes news and articles concerning Kurdish affairs in Syria, and 
which use discourse that promotes the Kurdish identity. For example, it refers to the Kurdish areas 
in Syria as ‘Western Kurdistan’ omitting any mention of Syria. Moreover, under a subsection titled 
‘pictures of Kurdistan’, the website shows landscape pictures that were taken in some Kurdish 
areas in Syria.217 Besides, the PYD has created a Facebook page that has some 18,700 members, 
in which the party posts its news. Also, the PYD founded a Channel on YouTube to which it 
regularly uploads videos of its activities.218  
 
1.2.2 The KNC: fragility and division? 
The KNC is an umbrella opposition group that was co-founded in Erbil, Iraq under the patronage 
of Massoud Barazani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KNC consists 
of sixteen Kurdish parties belonging to the old guard, but it is dominated by individuals affiliated 
with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is Barazani’s own party.219 Although the KNC 
is the PYD’s only rival, its chances are nonetheless limited, due to the growth of fragmentation 
and faction amongst its members over constitutive issues like ideology and framework. 
Furthermore, power struggles and personal enmity seem to have hindered the KNC in pursuit of 
its objectives.220 The KNC originally sought to produce an identity based on the Kurdish patriotic 
feeling, and to achieve a greater degree of autonomy for the Kurdish people, while acting in a 
context of transnational affiliation with Syria. However, unlike the PYD, the KNC advocated more 
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of a policy of integration with post-Assad Syria. In its discourse, the KNC frequently voices an 
affiliation with the Syrian state. As a brief extract from its political framework highlights this 
perspective: 
“The Syrian people are undertaking an epic, peaceful, revolutionary journey that seeks to oust 
authoritarianism from power. This revolution aims to build a democratic plural state, a watan, 
(‘motherland’) for all [Syrians], regardless of their religions, ethnicities and sects. The Kurdish 
people in Syria presents one component of the Syrian people, [and] an essential and purebred 
ingredient of the country. [Hence, KNC calls for] the elimination of discriminatory policies and 
laws, including the prohibition of the use of the Kurdish language and the establishment of Kurdish 
schools. The KNC advocates a policy of political decentralisation, while remaining in the context 
of Syria’s territorial entity”.221 However, this only a vague delineation of the KNC’s concept of 
decentralisation. 
Indeed, the KNC aimed to reproduce Kurdish identity by emphasising the importance of Kurdish 
elements, and by exploiting the symbols and myths from Kurdish history. For example, the KNC’s 
website devoted a special section to stories about Kurdish national heroes, dubbed ‘in order not to 
forget’.222 Another section labeled ‘today’s character’223, and a subsection titled ‘today in history’ 
was designed to evoke special events in the Kurdish history. Additionally, the KNC often 
displayed both the Kurdish and the party flags alongside portrait of Barazani and other Kurdish 
nationalists, while the revolutionary flag was rarely waved by members of the Council. 
Importantly, although the KNC was founded in the early months of the uprising and fought hard 
to gain momentum, it nevertheless seemed that it could not secure a solid enough foothold to 
compete with the PYD and its material resources are weak in comparison with that of the PYD. In 
the first place, the KNC lacked a military presence equal to that of the YPG. Although the KDP 
trained thousands of KNC fighters, these were mainly Kurdish defectors from the Syrian army 
who were based in KRG and not in the Syrian Kurdish areas. Very few of them were operating in 
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Syria, and unlike YPG, their military presence was modest and fragile.224 Secondly, the KNC 
initiated a low-scale charitable network that provided social services to Kurdish people, such as 
distributing food baskets to those in need.  This network operated mainly in urban area and as a 
Kurdish activist affiliated with the KNC affirms, this compromised its effectiveness: 
“KNC’s social services [w]re not efficient and [were] not comparable to that of the PYD.  Unlike 
the PYD, the KNC lacked the funds and the logistic capabilities to deliver its services”.225 
In this vein, the KNC seemed to form a social contract with a particular stratum, namely the urban 
middle-classes of Amoda in Hassaka and Kobani in Aleppo. Unlike the PYD, the KNC was unable 
to mobilise the lower-classes from the rural and remote areas.226 
 
1.2.3. Union of Kurdish Youth Committees in Syria (UKYC), the new guard of the Kurdish 
opposition:  vulnerabilities and inadequate chances? 
A mere few weeks after the uprising,  UKYC was created by apolitical Kurdish youths who 
operated under the umbrella of the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), - a pivotal force in the 
uprising consisted of youth groups who organised themselves by resorting to social media-.227 
Essentially, the UKYC strove for the advancement of a civic identity that was based on citizenship 
rights, and which vehemently opposed secessionist aspirations while stressing the importance of 
association with the Syrian state. According to its manifesto, the group believes that: 
“The Kurdish national affiliation does not compete with the Syrian affiliation, rather they overlap 
each other. We do respect all the components of the Syrian society […]. The Kurdish people are 
an essential component of Syria, and hence they should accomplish their political, cultural and 
socio-economic rights. The Kurdish language should be considered as the first language in Syria 
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besides Arabic. The governing system of the Kurdish areas inside the Syrian state border should 
be determined via a public referendum by those inhabiting these areas”.228 
In essence, UKYC’s members represent the new guard in the Kurdish opposition who are 
educated, secular middle-class young people aged between 19 and 30. Most of these Kurdish 
youths are university students. Thus, prior to the uprising, they were not residing at the Kurdish 
enclaves. Although the main governmental universities are based in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, 
Latakia and Deir el-Zour, some key departments are based in Damascus University. Even though 
the private universities mushroomed in the mid-2000s, most of them were based in the suburbs of 
Damascus and were dominated by the elite of urban areas, who by and large are Arabs. Hence, 
Kurdish students had to move to other cities, mainly Damascus, Homs and Aleppo, to study and 
consequently, these youth became more integrated with Syrian Arabs than with the less educated 
contemporaries who remained in the Kurdish enclaves. Moreover, they became more integrated 
with Syrian Arabs than the older generation. Significantly, these Kurdish youths went back to their 
cities and towns after the outbreak of the uprising where, they attempted to establish ties between 
the Kurdish movements in their areas and with other youth groups from Arab areas. This served 
to enhance the Arab-Kurdish relations and to foster the growth of Syrian nationalism.229 For 
instance, a 25 year-old UKYC activist and medical student of Damascus University stresses his 
affiliation with the Syrian state. When asked whether he considers himself as a Syrian Kurd or a 
Kurd Syrian, he instantly replied: 
“I have always been asked to answer this question. But I cannot, and I consider it as senseless. It 
is as if you are asking me who I love more, my mother or my father?. I am a Syrian and I am a 
Kurd, why do I have to select one of them to come first?”.230 
An unaffiliated Kurdish youth interviewed by the International Crisis Group shares his 
perspective: 
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“There is a country called Syria, and as young Kurds we are part of it. I am a Kurd and a Syrian at 
the same time. I feel closer to a Syrian Arab of my age than to an Iraqi Kurd. The solution I see in 
Syria is to have a secular and democratic state that recognises my identity as a Kurd. I see my 
future with Syria, not with Barazani”.231 
However, on the other hand, some revolutionary youths of Arab origin voiced their suspicions 
about the UKYC’s endorsement of Kurdish symbolic elements, such as the Kurdish flag or graffiti 
in Kurdish language. For example, during an anti-regime protest in the Lawan district in the 
suburbs of Damascus (attended by the author), some Kurdish youth of the Barazeh area were 
banned by their Arab fellows from displaying the Kurdish flag, and as a result the Kurdish youth 
displayed their anger by leaving the protest.232 Hence, the Kurdish new guard and the Arab new 
guard does not constitute a solid opposition group. However, the new guard of the Kurdish 
opposition were determined to show their support of the nation-wide rebellion. For instance, the 
UKYC launched its anti-regime rallies on Fridays, and echoed the slogans, banners and themes of 
Friday’s demonstrations that were taking place in other Syrian cities in order to express solidarity 
with their fellow Arabs -as during the uprising, the main demonstrations often took place after 
Friday’s prayer session-. On the other hand, the PYD and the KNC held their rallies on 
Wednesdays to distinguish themselves from anti-Assad Syrian Arabs.233 However, although the 
youth of the UKYC are extremely active on the ground and formed the bedrock of the uprising in 
the Kurdish areas, their activities seem to have been restricted to urban areas, (particularly to 
Amouda and Qamishli) where, according to observers the PYD has a weaker position. In essence, 
the UKYC manipulated symbols and the accessible material structure in its attempts to reproduce 
a civic version of Kurdish identity that encourages Syrian-Kurdish cohesion. A good indicator is 
the profile picture of UKYC’s Facebook page (which has some 17,000 members), that shows the 
Syrian map surrounded by the revolutionary flag and the Kurdish flag, while in the middle writing 
in Arabic and in Kurdish reads:  ‘Syria is for all Syrians’.234 Moreover, in addition to using the 
Arabic language, the UKYC applied terminology that highlighted an affiliation with Syria, such 
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as ‘Syria’, ‘Syrian people’, ‘the uprising of Syrian people’. This contrasts with the stances of the 
PYD and the KNC, who frequently refer to the Kurdish enclaves as Kurdistan’s Syria or Western 
Kurdistan, and who often use the Kurdish language. In parallel, via collaboration with the UKYC, 
a group of apolitical Kurdish youth established a radio news station labeled wilat (‘motherland’ in 
Kurdish), which produces broadcasts that try to appeal to both Syrian Arabs and Kurds. Wilat’s 
programs and music were broadcasted in both Arabic and Kurdish in an attempt to bolster 
solidarity between Kurds and Arabs. According to insider sources at wilat, the radio station is self-
funded and relies on a team of Kurdish youth who are “well-educated and work inside Syria”.235 
Against this backdrop, the UKYC can be viewed as being a moderate actor in the Kurdish drama 
in its struggle to produce a civic trend in Kurdish identity. Yet these youths had some fatal flaws. 
Firstly, the UKYC lacked the funds and the support that other actors enjoyed, and it neither had a 
charitable network nor an armed wing to match the material power of its competitors. Secondly, 
the UKYC could not establish a social contract except with a particular stratum (the urban, 
educated youth of the middle-class), unlike its radical rival, the PYD, who successfully enlisted 
the support of Kurds in both remote and urban areas. Thirdly and most importantly, several 
members of the UKYC were subjected to suppression by the PYD and by the Syrian regime, which 
consequently lost them their foothold. Besides, given the length of the uprising and the speed with 
which it escalated, “these youth were hard-pressed to find room to grow within”.236 In the words 
of a former UKYC activist who fled to Turkey: 
“Political money and violence handicapped the UKYC and catalyst its fracture, many of its 
members fled the country due to the threat of the PYD, while some of them were mobilised by a 
particular Kurdish clique. Very few activists continued to operate there [in the Kurdish areas of 
Syria], but they were paralysed and were left to fight alone”.237 
 
Conclusion 
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Based on the above account, it seems that these political entrepreneurs; PYD, KNC and the UKYC 
play crucial roles in reproducing the Kurdish identity via a top-down approach. Indeed, all of them 
manipulated material structure and symbolic elements to reconstruct a particular version of 
identity. The interaction between variables in this top-down approach (political entrepreneurs, 
materials, symbols) seems to interplay with each other and also with the security dilemma. 
Consequently this interaction subject the Kurdish identity to a continuous process of reproduction. 
 
 
1.4 Kurdish identity amidst the realpolitik of Barazani and Erdogan: 
Like other regional players in neighboring countries, Turkey was alarmed by the power shift in the 
Kurdish situation across her southern borders, where the PYD, (a carbon copy of Turkey’s 
longstanding foe, the PKK) arose as a hegemonic actor. This posed a potential threat to Turkish 
national security, and hence the government in Ankara sought to develop strategies for neutralising 
the Kurdish threat. Based on political calculations, these strategies leaned towards a policy of 
containment rather than escalation, as Turkey determined not to physically enter the Syrian 
quagmire. Hence, the Turkish administration employed strategic tactics to remedy the situation. 
Firstly, it strengthened the PYD’s rivals, the KNC and also some Arab cliques among the 
opposition.238 Secondly, it entered into negotiations in an effort to solve the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey, seeking a ‘historical’ rapprochement with the PKK.239 Seemingly, the use of such rhetoric 
has had some crucial repercussions on the reproduction of Kurdish identity. 
In essence, the Turks sought to empower the KNC in order to redress the balance of power  
amongst the Kurdish players, and thus the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan lent its political 
support to the KNC via Ankara’s strategic allay, Massoud Barazani. On the other hand, Barazani 
seemed to share Turkey’s interests in curbing the PYD, since the latter presented a powerful rival 
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who would jeopardise the KDP’s foothold in Kurdish areas in the post-Assad era. Also, by enacting 
the role of mediator, Barazani aimed to gain a certain amount of leverage in Turkey. 240 
Pragmatically, his rhetoric vis-à-vis the PYD was twofold. In the first place, Barazani provided 
political, economic and, military support to the KNC but avoided causing any escalation.  In the 
second place, he aimed to forge an alliance with the PYD in order to contain its threat. Therefore, 
in July 2012, just before the withdrawal of the regime’s forces from the Kurdish areas, Barazani 
sponsored the Erbil Declaration, a power-sharing agreement between the two rivals according to 
which the PYD and the KNC would jointly govern Kurdish regions in Syria. Nevertheless, it seems 
that neither Erdogan nor Barazani achieved their objectives in curbing the PYD, since on the 
ground the KNC could not compete with the PYD’s rapidly accelerating power.241 
 Additionally, Turkey sought to weaken the PYD by bolstering Syrian Arab opposition cliques 
who harbor anti-Kurdish sentiment, particularly the Syrian National Council (SNC), of which the 
KNC was a former member.242 The SNC has openly and repeatedly emphasised the ‘Arabic 
character’ of Syria, and labeled the Kurdish ambition of federalism as an “illusion”.243 In effect, 
this provoked the PYD to accuse Turkey and the SNC of countering Kurdish aspirations.244 
Likewise, the Syrian national Coalition, (another opposition faction sponsored by Turkey), refuted 
the KNC’s proposal to drop the word ‘Arab’ from the name ‘Syrian Arab Republic’. 245  
Consequently, this accentuated the Arabs-Kurdish divide. 
In this light, it should be noted that, since the onset of the uprising, various factions of the non-
Kurdish opposition have striven to mobilise the Kurdish population. However, it seemed that they 
could neither develop appropriate strategies for tackling the Kurdish question, nor for mitigating 
Arab-Kurdish tensions. On the one hand, Islamist opposition blocs, supported by Turkey, have 
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openly criticised the KNC’s rhetoric and rejected its logic while ignoring chances for reconciliation 
.On the other hand, cliques of the secular opposition, such as the Coordination Committee for 
Democratic Change (of which the PYD is a senior member), has vaguely discussed issues of 
federalism and autonomy that are crucial concerns for the Kurds.246  Moreover, the non-Kurdish 
opposition could not formulate a clear vision of how the Kurdish question would be addressed in 
the post-Assad era. As a Kurdish analyst argues, this effectively provoked the Kurds to manipulate 
the uprising for their own ends: 
“Kurds are now fighting to achieve their rights, which were denied by the Assad regime prior to 
the uprising, and which during the uprising were neglected by the opposition”.247 
Against this backdrop, the conclusion that imposes itself is that the realpolitik strategies developed 
by Erdogan and Barazani played important roles in reproducing Kurdish identity that served their 
agendas. Although both of them applied policy of containment in their attempts to reconcile 
Kurdish factions, they nevertheless inflamed identity clashes from above by supporting a particular 
player against the other. Both politicians sought to uphold the KNC’s version of a moderate 
identity over the PYD’s radical version of Kurdish identity. Furthermore, they positioned these 
identities at odds with the Arab identity. Indeed, the top-down rhetoric by these external political 
entrepreneurs emphasised the ethnic boundaries between both identity groups.  
 
2. Discourses from below 
As has been discussed in chapter two, for approximately fifty years the Kurds of Syria were banned 
from displaying any symbolic element of their identity, such as music and costumes. Instead they 
were forced to alter symbolic features of their Kurdish identity to accord with Arab identity, such 
as by changing their Kurdish names to Arabic names.248 Hence, it is unsurprisingly that since the 
outset of the uprising Kurds have been determined to emphasis the symbols and myths of their 
ethnicity. Although political entrepreneurs of the various Kurdish factions utilised Kurdish 
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symbols to construct identity, these symbols nevertheless seemed to bolster Kurdish national 
sentiment at the grassroots level without being completely directed from above. 
Notably, since the onset of the uprising, Kurdish language, music, dance, customs and flags have 
been visibly presented across Kurdish regions in Syria.249 Kurds are now publicly allowed to dance 
the popular Kurdish dabbkih (a folklore dance), and to wave the Kurdish flag. Furthermore, the 
Newroz festival (the most important festival in the Kurdish culture), is now celebrated openly by 
tens of thousands of Kurds without the risk of their being punished by the Syrian regime.250 
Certainly, the presentation of such symbols strengthened the Kurdish sense of ethnic belonging as 
well as instilling in the Kurdish people a sense of pride in their ethnicity.  More importantly, the 
public displays of such symbolic elements seem to interact with the discourses direct from above 
and the insecurity crisis, and therefore subject the Kurdish identity to a continuous process of 
reproduction.  Sidar, a Kurdish youth of Qamishli, acknowledged the influential role of symbols 
in bolstering a Kurdish individual’s affinity with his or her ethnicity. When asked to give his 
perspective on Kurdish Symbols, such as the Kurdish flag and the Newroz festival, he replied 
passionately that: 
“These symbols personify my existence. When chanting azadi (‘freedom’ in Kurdish) and waving 
the Kurdish flag I tell the others that I’m a Kurd. I feel very proud of my Kurdish belonging”.251 
Notably, throughout the uprising, the Kurdish language (a key symbol of Kurdish identity), 
dominated the discourse heard in the Kurdish enclaves where during anti-regimes marches, most 
slogans, songs and banners were voiced in the Kurdish language. Moreover, shortly after the 
withdrawal of the regime’s forces, a myriad of schools started to teach core modules in Kurdish 
language, and devoted three hours of the school-day to teaching the Kurdish language at an 
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advanced level. 252 Speaking in Kurdish, Syrian Kurd teachers appeared on the al-Arabiya Satellite 
Channel, affirming that: “the first teaching language [in Kurd’s regions of Syria] should be Kurdish 
while Arabic and English should be secondary”.253 Also, pictures and videos of rallies and other 
revolutionary activities conducted in the Kurdish areas were frequently posted online. As a result, 
many Syrian Arabs were alarmed by the dominance of Kurdish symbols, and regarded their fellow 
Kurds with suspicion. For instance Bakir, a Syria Arab rebel, stated his concerns about the 
presentation of Kurdish symbols: 
“I watch videos of their [the Kurds] protests and I cannot understand a word, since everything is 
in Kurdish. It seems that they have already created Kurdistan in Syria. They are opportunists”.254 
In this context, the Syrian regime endorsed the use of symbolic elements of Kurdish identity in its 
quest to mobilise the Kurds. For instance, on 21 March 2012, Syrian State TV broadcast live 
footage for the first time in half a century of the Newroz celebration, showing Kurdish youths 
dancing dabbkih. Furthermore, the Kurds were allowed to give interviews in the Kurdish 
language.255 
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All in all, although the manipulation of symbols was crucial to state and non-state political 
entrepreneurs’ quest to reproduce Kurdish identity, symbolic elements also operated at the 
grassroots level where they interacted with discourses directed from above in the context of the 
security dilemma, and helped to construct identity clashes. Flags, music, language, customs and 
other symbolic features played vital role in empowering the Kurdish identity and generating 
Kurdish national sentiment, in that they highlight the line that distinguishes Kurdish identity from 
other identities. In other words, they emphasise the notion of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, and hence serve 
as potential motivations for identity clashes.  
 
Conclusion 
On the basis of this analysis, the Syrian uprising paved the way for the reconstruction of Kurdish 
identity. Four variables seem to play the pivotal role in reconstructing Kurdish identity and in 
provoking identity clashes. In the first place, state and non-state political entrepreneurs strove to 
reproduce a Kurdish identity that would be compliant with their aim. In the second and in the third 
place, all of these actors utilised materials and symbolic factors (such as media, arms and Kurdish 
folklore) to reinforce Kurdish identity over the Arab identity. On the one hand, the Syrian regime 
deployed policies of containment towards the Kurds in an attempt to divide the already fragmented 
opposition, and to neutralise the Kurdish risk in the northeast of the country. Hence, the regime 
provided the Kurds a quasi-autonomy. On the other hand, relying simultaneously on materialistic 
and symbolic features, the KNC, PYD and the UKYC were competing to reproduce different 
versions of Kurdish identity. As this chapter has demonstrated, the KNC and the PYD vied to 











achieve greater autonomy for Kurds, and to associate the national sentiment with the Kurdish 
nation exclusively, rather than with the Syrian state. By contrast, the UKYC attempted to 
reproduce a Kurdish identity that highlighted an affiliation with the Syrian state, and which sought 
to foster accord among Kurds and Arabs. In fact, each of these players utilised material structure, 
and symbolic factors to reshape the Kurdish identity while struggling to consolidate his position 
in relation to other players. However, wide discrepancy in capabilities afforded the PYD a 
hegemonic status. Although the PYD lacked international legitimacy, it succeeded in establishing 
a solid power triangle composed of military, economic and public bases of support. This is owing 
to its productive mobilisation of various social strata under its umbrella, by which it came to be 
the de facto governor of Kurdish affairs. The KNC, suffered from fragmentation, and did not 
succeed in forming a power triangle to equal that of the PYD.  Although the KNC benefited from 
regional and international backing, it lacked military and public support, and could not broaden its 
supportive base. On the other hand, the UKYC seems to have been the weakest competitor, as it 
lacked any pillars of power. No arms, no funds and no support, either at the international or 
grassroots level. Furthermore, most youths of the UKYC fled Syria for security reasons, which 
played a pivotal role in thwarting their attempts to seek out integration within the Syrian state. Yet, 
seemingly, regardless the variation in their agendas and capabilities, all of these political 
entrepreneurs reproduce Kurdish identity on a top-down approach and heir discourses provoke 
identity clashes. The final variable which seems to play pivotal role in reconstructing Kurdish 
identity is the insecurity crisis that the Kurds faced. Indeed, the security dilemma –which escalated 
with the length of the conflict- emphasises the ethnic boundaries between Arab and the Kurdish 
identity group. 
In summary, policies from above, deployed by the Syrian regime, Kurdish political entrepreneurs, 
Syrian Arab opposition and regional powers exploited Kurdish identity for realpolitik ends. All of 
these actors manipulated material and symbolic elements to advance a particular brand of Kurdish 
identity. More importantly, these top-down discourses interacted with discourse directed from 
below, and this interaction (which takes place in the presence of security dilemma) subjected the 
Kurdish identity to an enduring process of reproduction.  At the time of writing, however, it is still 
unclear as to what version of identity will be finalised by this process, and what implications it 





of empowerment, thanks to the Arab spring, which seems to have blossomed largely for the sake 
of Kurdish interests. 
Chapter Five 
The quest to construct hawiyya wataniyya or ‘national identity’: 
On March 04, 2013, hundreds of anti-Assad protesters gathered in the central square of al-Raqa 
city in northern Syria, the first city to come under the absolute control of the rebels, where a 
gigantic bronze statue erected in honour of the late Syrian president Hafiz Assad was pulled down. 
Videos and pictures of this scene spread throughout the online community. This generated a 
widespread Syrianist sentiment, as anti-Assad activists commended the fact that, unlike what 
happened in Iraq in 2003, the statue of a “dictator was pulled down by national hands and not by 
western tanks”.256 Pictures of this event were posted on social media websites, and were attached 
to the famous image of an American tank toppling the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad’s 
main square in April 2003. However, the slogan inscribed beneath the picture of Assad’s statue 
denotes a sense of Syrian national pride, as it reads: sina’aah souriyya, a ‘Syrian production’.257 
On the same date and location, dozens of protesters were chanting: “neither Sunnis nor Alawites, 
Syria is about national unity”.258 Nevertheless, Islamist militants rapidly joined the protest and 
altered this slogan to an Islamist one that said: “our leader forever is our prophet Mohamed”.259 
Certainly, this incident indicated the nature of the ongoing identity clashes and, more importantly, 
the existing attempts to reproduce a Syrian national identity, as well as indicating that the concept 
of Syrianism has taken root and was functioning in the popular imagination. In this vein, Michel 
Kilo, a prominent opposition figure, stresses that the uprising endowed the nation with a “historical 
chance to reproduce a monolithic version of hawiyya wataniyya (‘national identity’) that is based 
on the notion of freedom and that would unite all Syrians”.260  In fact, a myriad of secular 
movements emerged throughout the uprising, which strove to construct a national identity that 
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prioritises an affiliation with the Syrian state and advocates the establishment of dawlet al-
mwatana, ‘state of citizenship’.  However, geographic, political and socio-economic factors 
influence the leverage of these groups, which this thesis divides into two main factions; the old 
guard and the new guard. Mainly, the old guard is comprised of the longstanding opposition figures 
who emerged out of the Arab nationalist, (also communist and leftist) traditions. Hence, the stances 
of anti-sectarianism, anti-westernism and anti-interventionism come naturally to these individuals. 
Some notable examples of these figures are Louay Hussein, Haytham Mana’a, Riad Seif, Aref 
Dalila, AbdulAziz al-Khayer and Michel Kilo. As has been mentioned in chapter two, some ten 
years prior to the uprising these figures launched the so-called Damascus spring which sought the 
establishment of a democratic state, though it was later crushed by the new inheritor of Syria’s 
throne. On the other hand, the new guard represents the secular, apolitical youth, who were inspired 
by their Egyptians and Tunisians counterparts, and who, in their search for empowerment, found 
themselves in the midst of the political arena. However, in the two years’ duration of the Syrian 
uprising, neither of these groups introduced a charismatic leader capable of fostering their power 
and, most importantly, neither of them presented a cohesive front. Instead, they were deeply 
divided over important issues, like violent versus peaceful struggle, and pro- military intervention 
versus anti-military intervention. Furthermore, those based inside Syria were at odds with those 
who were in exile.261 Nevertheless, despite their vulnerabilities, these groups were represented in 
the Syrian drama, and fought hard to establish footholds that would allow them to compete with 
other players. Indeed, both of these political entrepreneurs directed their discourses from above 
and manipulated materials and symbols to reconstruct Syrian national identity, however the 
security dilemma seems to pose a critical obstacle to their attempt.  This chapter studies the 
continuous reconstruction of Syrian national identity which resulted from the interplay between 
discourses directed from above and those directed from below. The first section of this chapter 
focuses on the role of political entrepreneurs among the old guard as well as the new guard in 
reproducing national identity from above. The second section examines the role of symbolic 
elements in reproducing national identity from below. 
 
                                                          







1. The top-down approach 
1.1  Endeavours by the old guard of the Syrian opposition: 
1.1.1. The Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (CCDC) ha’y’it al-tansyq li al-
taghyyir al-dymuqratiy 
The CCDC is a collation of fourteen leftist parties that was formally established in June 2011 in 
Damascus, where it mainly functions. It is commanded by renowned figures of the old guard such 
as Haytham Mana’a and AbdulAziz al-Khayer who come from various religious and ethnic 
backgrounds. For instance, Mana’a is a Sunni from Dar’a, while Khayer is an Alawite from 
Qurdaha, the birthplace of Assads. Essentially, the CCDC advocated the peaceful transition of 
Syria to a democratic state, in which all Syrians would be “treated equally despite their communal 
affiliations”.262 Hassan AbdulAzim, its General Coordinator, summarises the CCDC’s rhetoric 
vis-à-vis the uprising with three slogans “no to violence, no to sectarianism and no to military 
intervention”.263  Principally, the CCDC wished to generate a national identity that would prioritise 
the individual’s association with the Syrian nation, and to rebuff any attempts to steer the 
revolution towards fundamentalism. Hence, the CCDC opposed the efforts of other opposition 
cliques, (particularly the Islamists) to reproduce sectarian identity.  In its discourse, the CCDC 
emphasised the use of terms such as wataniyya (‘patriotism’), watan (‘motherland’), al-sh’ab al-
souriyy (‘the Syrian people’), and al-qarar al-wataniy (‘national decision’), and rejected the 
sectarian rhetoric of other opposition factions. Notably, since its creation, the CCDC has become 
an outspoken foe to other (mainly exiled) opposition groups, who supported the militarisation of 
the uprising and who were dominated by Islamists. Consequently, this increased the division 
among anti-Assad groups, and reduced the CCDC’s credibility in the eyes of many Syrians, for 
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whom the militarisation of the uprising was a reaction to the Syrian regime’s military solution.264 
Though the CCDC sought to gather momentum and to boost its power in the period immediately 
after its foundation, its chances were nevertheless limited by its lack of unity, supportive base and 
its perceived lack of legitimacy. As has been argued in chapter two, the Syrian regime applied a 
strategy of divide -and- rule politics to fragment its opponents, and hence it promoted the CCDC 
as al-mu’arada al- wataniyya (‘a patriotic opposition faction’), which the regime pronounced itself 
ready to engage in dialogue with. This raised questions about the CCDC’s legitimacy, and 
prompted some Syrians to accuse the CCDC of allying itself with the regime. This perception was 
heightened by the fact that the CCDC deplored the use of armed struggle, and vehemently criticised 
the actions of other opposition groups, particularly the Islamists. Moreover, the regime portrayed 
the CCDC’s figures as being wataniyyun (‘patriotic’), and shurafa’ (‘honest’), and stressed that 
most of them were based in Syria, unlike the members of other opposition factions, many of whom 
were in exile. In effect, this widened the gap between internal and external opposition cliques. 
 However, viewed in this light, the CCDC did not represent a monolithic unit. Instead, it suffered 
from fragmentation, which provoked many of its members to defect from it only a few months 
after its creation. Two cases in point are Michel Kilo and Burhan Ghalioun.265 In parallel, the 
widening gap between the CCDC’s leadership and its youth members seemed to reduce its power, 
since although the CCDC mobilised an array of shabab al-thawra (‘the revolutionary youth’) 
under its umbrella, it could not form an effective communication channels with them.  In this light, 
the CCDC had attempted to craft a social contract with the secular, educated youth of the urban 
and rural middle-classes (most of them aged between 23 and 33 year-old) who, though they inhabit 
Damascus, they originally come from rural areas. Notably, they also belong to different sectarian 
backgrounds coming from sects as diverse as Sunnis, Alawites, Ismailis and Christians. 266 
Nevertheless, the numbers of the CCDC’s youth members was relatively small compared with that 
of other opposition groups.267 In addition, coordination and cooperation between the CCDC’s 
leadership and some of its members among the new guard seemed to be insufficient, as most of 
the revolutionary activities were being undertaken without the supervision of the old guard. For 
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instance, according to a CCDC member, the leadership is not involved in revolutionary activities 
on the ground – such as the designing of flyers and banners – that aimed to foster national unity, 
and to promote the CCDC’s logic. Instead, these procedures were conducted individually by 
shabab al-thawra, who rarely had the opportunity to discuss their working strategy with their 
mentors. In fact, many of the CCDC’s youth members interviewed by the author claimed that their 
leaders did not establish effective communication channels with them, and went on to  accuse the 
old guard of “lacking the appropriate vision of how to apply their logic on the battlefield”.268 
Thereafter, many of the new guard decided to defect from the CCDC. Tammam, a  28 year-old 
former CCDC member hailing from Msyaf in western Hama and working in Damascus, 
encapsulates the new guard perspective on the CCDC: 
“I totally agree with the CCDC’s logic. Its leadership has a deep understanding of Syria’s political 
realm, but their rhetoric towards us [the new guard] and towards the revolution stems from the old 
school. Shortly after its creation, the CCDC became a paralysed political organisation that only 
issues press releases, rather than a revolutionary coalition that engages in the uprising. It was 
incapable of formulating strategies that suited the revolution and the new circumstances it 
imposed. Moreover, its leadership is divided and its figures are fighting for power. And most 
importantly, they are seeking to ride the revolution, as it provided them with what they have been 
pursuing for decades”.269 
Against this backdrop, it seems that the CCDC has not established the necessary material structures 
which, as according to inside sources, the CCDC is self-funded and does not receive funds from 
external powers, since it is strongly opposed to outside intervention. As a result, its sources and 
supplies are very limited. Nevertheless it runs a charitable network that provides humanitarian aid 
to those affected by the uprising, in September 2012, it distributed food baskets in the Qaddam 
district of Damascus.270 Additionally, although the CCDC use online media to endorse its rhetoric, 
this was limited to a Facebook page, and to a website on which press releases and articles written 
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by the old guard were regularly posted. Therefore, the material structures that the CCDC relied on 




1.1.2.   tayar bina’a al-dawla al-Souriyya ‘Building the Syrian State Current’; 
Soon after defecting from the CCDC, a former communist called Louay Hussein co-founded the 
Building the Syrian State Current (BSSC). This is a political movement that brought together 
secular Syrians from various ideological and sectarian backgrounds. Though it is based and 
operates mainly in Damascus, it has a few representatives in Aleppo and other cities. Hussein, an 
Alawite by birth, is a well-established figure in the old guard, and spent nine years in custody 
during the Hafiz Assad era. Like the CCDC, the BSSC opposed the use of violence and external 
involvement in the uprising, and stood against myriad opposition cliques, especially the Islamists. 
Furthermore, the BSSC depicted Islamist militias as “terrorist groups”271, a term that is frequently 
used by the Assad regime in reference to the rebels.  In essence, the BSSC’s primary objective 
consisted of building a democratic state that would guarantee the “principle of citizenship and 
equality for all Syrian citizens regardless of their ethnic and religious affiliations”.272 In fact, it 
sought to boost al-wihda al-wataniyya (‘national unity’) and to create dawla madaniyya (‘a civic 
state’) discarding any models of theocracy or federalization. However, as observers have argued, 
the BSSC lacked any practical or clear strategies with which to achieve these goals.273 Moreover, 
for many anti-Assad Syrians, the BSSC did not represent a legitimate player, since the rhetoric it 
used to denounce Islamists, armed struggle and western intervention was equivalent to that of the 
Syrian regime. Besides, although Hussein was captured for a very short period during the early 
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days of the uprising, soon after his release the Syrian regime begun to turn a blind eye to the 
BSSC’s political activities. This raised suspicions that the BSSC had allied itself with the Assad 
regime. For example, Hussein was allowed to give statements to the media and to conduct meetings 
in the heart of Damascus. In September 2012, he met the UN/Arab League especial representative 
for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, at the Dedeman hotel in Damascus, from where he gave anti-regime 
statements to the Syrian State media.274 Accordingly, the BSSC’s position deteriorated, since on 
the one hand the Current lost credibility as an opposition platform, and on the other hand the 
divisions between the BSSC and other factions of the opposition were widening. A good indicator 
of this deterioration is the failure of the so-called Semiramis conference, which was orchestrated 
in Damascus in June 2011 by Hussein himself and by some notable members of the CCDC. 
Unprecedentedly, under the theme of ‘Syria is for all; in the shadow of a democratic civil state’, 
some two hundred anti-regime intellectuals met openly in the heart of the Syrian capital, in an 
effort to advance Syrianist sentiment and to propose a political solution for transforming the 
country into a democratic state.275 However, the conference proved to be fruitless, and it mirrored 
the fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, since many factions boycotted and denounced the 
conference. Most importantly, the conference was strongly opposed by the youth movements. In 
this vein, the BSSC sought to endear itself to the new guard in an attempt to construct a supportive 
base that would bolster its power. In fact, like the CCDC, the BSSC managed to forge a social 
contract with the secular youth of Damascus, who belonged to various identity groups and who 
were residing in Damascus despite hailing from other cities and towns. These, intellectual youth 
(largely aged between 23 and 33 years old) advocated the use of peaceful means in overthrowing 
the autocracy and dismissed the militarisation of the uprising. Consequently, their revolutionary 
activities were limited to protests, sit-ins and the organisation of online campaigns. However, the 
BSSC’s new guard represented an extremely small clique that functioned mainly in the capital. 
For instance, Ali, a 27-year old anti-Assad activist, stresses that although he agrees with the 
BSSC’s use of rhetoric to promote Syrian national identity and to reject military intervention. He 
refused to be one of its members: 
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“We [the revolutionary youth] do not want to be polarised. The BSSC tried many times to hijack 
events that we organised. In March 19, 2012, we launched a charitable campaign dubbed ‘Homs 
is in our hearts’. The campaign’s supreme goal was to show solidarity with those Syrians stuck 
amidst the violence in Homs. Yet the BSSC, via its website, claimed that it was the political body 
that had sponsored ‘Homs in our hearts’. It was us not them who organised it, and who later got 
arrested because of it”.276 Ali is a civil activist who, with around 35 other young people, co-
founded shu fiy al-youm (‘what is happening today?’). This represented a small group of educated, 
secular, young people youth (aged between 19 and 28) from the urban middle-classes who 
belonged to different identity group, (Ali himself is a Shiite).  This group aimed to promote Syrian 
unity via peaceful revolutionary activities, such as undertaking aid campaigns and organising 
protests, yet its fieldwork was restricted to urban areas, mainly in Damascus. In this context, the 
BSSC could not establish charitable networks, as it is self-funded and therefore lacked the 
necessary resources. Thus, its usage of the material structures was limited to social media (mainly 
Facebook and YouTube), through which the Current promote for its ideology.277 
 
1.2. The new guard of the Syrian secular opposition; an emerging player in the Syrian 
drama? 
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the Syrian uprising witnessed the rise of a new secular 
actor in the political theater, an actor that has been marginalised as long as the secular opposition 
platform has been manipulated by the old guard. As chapter two explains, although the old guard 
has a historical record of political struggle against authoritarianism, they nevertheless failed to 
effect any change. Inspired by their revolutionary counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, 
Syria’s secular youth seems to represent a top-down actor who is vying to secure a foothold in the 
Syrian drama. Therefore, the growth of anti-Assad youth movements mushroomed, each group 
struggling to resist attempts to steer the uprising in a sectarian direction, while also seeking to 
reconstruct a Syrian national identity. The following section focuses on two youth movements that 
were extremely active during the first two years of the uprising. Also, this section sheds light on 
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the use of communication channels created by the new guard in their efforts to construct a Syrian 
national identity.  
 
1.2.1 Tsunamiy al-hurriyya, the ‘Tsunami of Freedom movement’: 
This movement was co-founded in Damascus in May 2011. It is a civil movement whose 
principally aim is to reproduce a Syrian national identity in which the individual’s association with 
the Syrian state is the dominant. According to its founder, Oula Ramadan (an Alawite by birth), 
the axial goal of this movement is to “induce the unity of Syrian people in order to overthrow the 
Assad-regime and to build a democratic state, a state of citizenship”.278 The social demographic to 
which the members of tsunamiy al-hurriya belong is the well-educated, middle-class stratum of 
young people (roughly aged between 22 and 32), who belong to various identity groups. Although 
they reside in the Syrian capital, they are not originally Damascenes. Furthermore, some of them 
are secular, while others are atheists. Practically speaking, these young people represent the 
bedrock of the peaceful struggle against the Assad regime, as they conducted self-funded, peaceful 
activities, such as organising protests and sit-ins, producing documentaries and distributing flyers 
that employed materialistic and symbolic elements in an effort to generate a sense of Syrianism in 
the populace. For example, one of the flyers that tsunamiy al-hurriyya distributed in Damascus in 
July 2011, says; ana w Mohamed w Elias w Ali rbynna sawa (‘me, Mohamed, Elias and Ali have 
grown up together’). This is a cross sectarian slogan, as the names refer to various identity groups: 
Ali for Alawites or Shiites, Elias for Christians, and Mohamed for Sunnis. This propaganda was 
part of the first campaign launched by tsunamiy al-hurriyya in July 2011. The campaign’s theme 
recalled the primary goal of the Syrian uprising; ‘the people want to overthrow the regime’. 
Moreover, its logo underscored the sine qua non of the movement, as it displayed the Syrian map 
with writing in the middle that reads minhibik (‘we love you’). Reportedly, flyers and stickers for 
this campaign spread throughout Damascus. According to Ramadan, the campaign was a 
straightforward endeavor “to stress that love and loyalty should be for al-watan (‘motherland’) 
and not for an individual, a religion or a sect”.279 As has been observed by the author, the working 
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field of tsunamiy al-hurriyya was limited to the capital, where on some occasions the group 
cooperated with other factions of youth movements. One such faction was the Local Coordination 
Committees of the Revolution (LCC) operating in midan and in kafrsuseh which, as has been 
argued in chapter three, were associated with Sufis. Therefore, there were many incidents in which 
disagreements over secular discourse (such as slogans, banners and flyers) surfaced between both 
youth movements.280  
Essentially, tsunamiy al-hurriyya did not receive support from any state or non-state actors. 
However some factions of the old guard, such as the BSSC strove to mobilise the youth of this 
movement. Nevertheless, members of tsunamiy el-hurriyya continuously refuted such attempts at 
polarisation because, as Ramadan notes, the power of the movement rested on its apolitical, 
revolutionary youth image. And therefore, the movement “stood against attempts by the old guard 
to ride shabab al-thawra”.281 Importantly, by September 2012, several members of tsunami al-
hurriyya had fled Syria, due to suppression by the Assad regime, and took refuge either in 
neighbouring countries (namely, Lebanon and Jordan) or in Europe (particularly in Paris and 
Germany). From these locations they generally resumed their quest to advance a national identity. 
This time, however, they attempted to achieve their objective via the online community, rather 
than acting on the ground. This reduced the power of the movement and diminished its foothold 
over other players. 
1.2.2 Tajamu’a  nabed li al-shabab al-madaniy  al-souriyy ‘Pulse Gathering for Syrian Civil 
Youth’; 
Nabed is among the first and the largest civil youth movements that were created in the third month 
of the uprising with the aim of “mobilising youths who seek the establishment of a civil state […] 
and advocating the peaceful transfer for power”.282 Its core objective is to “strengthen Syrian unity 
and to transform Syria into a plural state”.283 Referring to its manifesto, the key principles that 
underpin nabed’s rhetoric are the advancement of democracy, pluralism and citizenship rights, by 
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which “sectarian affiliations could be transcended”.284 Insider sources in nabed claim that it has 
dozens of hundreds of members working across Syria in cities like Damascus, Deir al-Zour, Homs, 
Aleppo, Hama, Qamishli and even in their suburbs.285 Indeed, nabed asserted itself as an active 
player on the ground and succeeded in lobbying secular youth followers of various identity groups, 
such as Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Ismailis, Kurds and Druze. Nabed’s members can be 
categorised as belonging to the apolitical, well-educated youth of the urban middle-classes, though 
some of them come from the lower-classes of the rural areas, who moved to the city for study. 
Nabed sought to deliver its message via revolutionary procedures, such as by organising 
demonstrations and campaigns. Moreover, members of nabed often took part at revolutionary 
activities launched by Islamist opposition groups (for example, they participated in protests 
dominated by Islamists while displaying banners rejecting sectarianism) in an attempt to “let [the 
secular] voice be heard”.286  One case in point is a banner that was displayed by a nabed follower 
during a protest in Raqa city that was organised by militant Islamists in March 2013. The writing 
in the banner reads: “Syria is a country for all, no exclusion, no exception”287. In this context, 
nabed depended on symbols (such as the evocation of Syrian history), and material structures for 
promoting Syrian national identity. Additionally, like other opposition actors, it utilised online 
media to endorse its logic, and hence it created a Facebook page (which has some 13,600 
followers) in which it uploaded videos and pictures of its revolutionary activities.288 Also, nabed 
ran a low-scale charity network that provided humanitarian aid to those affected by the uprising 
such as by delivering food-baskets to families who fled their homes due to bombardments. 
However, according to a senior member at nabed, this charitable work was “inadequate as nabed 
lacked the funding sources”.289  It is worth mentioning that during the uprising, many youth 
associated with nabed were punished by the regime, and hence they either suspended their 
membership or opted to flee the country. Consequently, this handicapped the movement and 
limited its capability to gathering momentum. 
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1.2.3. The axial tool in the hands of the new guard:290 
As they belong to the age of globalisation and information technology, the new guard utilised new 
forms of media to strike a unifying chord amongst Syrians, and to reduce any logistic hindrances 
to their activities.  They successfully established communication channels to endorse their logic, 
one notable example of which is Souriali or ‘Syrianist’, a radio station created in October 2012 in 
Beirut, Lebanon, where its staff are mostly based. However, it has few correspondents operating 
inside Syria. It aired its programs online as well as uploading its programs onto social media 
websites. In essence, Souriali strove to advance a sense of Syrian national unity, and to identify 
itself with all Syrians, regardless of their political and religious affiliations. Its philosophy is that:  
“Souriali serves as a platform for Syrians to talk about Syria, without borders and without 
limits”.291 Fundamentally, Souriali’s programs were designed to evoke Syrian history, symbols 
and folklore in an attempt to reproduce a national identity. For example, it continues to broadcast 
a sixty-minute weekly program entitled ‘ayam al-lulu (‘days of pearls’), which recalls aspects of 
Syrian history during the 1970s, 80s and 90s of the last century. It also airs a weekly program, 
dubbed hakawaty souriyy a (‘Syrian storyteller’) which uses a sarcastic tone to denounce the 
division between Syrians of various ethnicities.292  Reportedly, young people from the urban 
middle-classes form the backbone of the Souriali staff, who are educated and are highly skilled in 
using information technology. However, most of them left Syria shortly after the onset of the 
uprising.293 
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A second case in point is Souriatna or (‘our Syria’). This is a weekly magazine established in 
September 2011 by a group of middle-class Damascenes (aged between 20 to 27 year-old), who 
were based in Damascus, some of whom subsequently went  into exile, particularly, in 
Lebanon.294As the name indicates, Souriatna strove to foster Syrian nationalism and to “underlines 
that Syria is the home for all Syrians, rejecting the logic of radicalization and discrimination”295. 
In issues of sixteen pages each, Souriatna publishes reports, comics, interviews and articles that 
expounds principles of democracy and citizenship, and that recall Syria’s history. For instance, it 
includes a column entitled wjuoh min wataniyy (‘faces from my motherland’) devoted to recalling 
Syrian national figures from the previous century. Arguably, Souriatna had a limited number of 
readers, as its print issues were only distributed in the capital, and were distributed throughout a 
tight circle of Syrian activists. However, high quality editions of these issues were accessible on 
an online blog and also on Souriatna’s Facebook page. 
The final example of these communication channels is a website called dawlaty (‘my state’), which 
was created in January 2013 by secular activists who aimed to promote Syrianism, and to 
emphasise the crucial role of the reconciliation in rebuilding post-Assad Syria. According to its 
founding statement, dawlaty’s foremost mission is to: 
“Seek to enact Syria’s transition to a state of citizenship, to eliminate the tendency for revenge, to 
boost the peaceful struggle, and to increase the dialogue between all different factions of civil 
society”.296 
In essence, dawlaty’s strategies for fulfilling these goals were centered on the use of visual images 
to raise awareness and to indoctrinate Syrians with Syrianist sentiment. Hence, the website 
published videos and graffiti that highlighted the importance of unity between Syrians, and which 
denounced sectarian discourse. Although most of dawlaty’s staff were based in exile, few of its 
members continued to work inside Syria. Also, dawlaty’s staff inside and outside Syria tended to 
cooperate with nabed and other movements of the new guard.  One example of dawlaty’s graffiti 
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is: “Syria is free and civil”,297 a slogan that was displayed in March 2013 in al-Raqa. Two other 
examples of graffiti were presented in the Attareb suburb of Aleppo, which summarise dawlaty’s 
main objective. They read: “Syria is for all, for me and for you”,298 and “Syria is a mother to all 
its sons”.299 In addition, dawlaty produced videos that stressed its goal of including the various 
identity groups. Notably, some of these videos recalled Syria’s history and promoted the 
importance of civil rights. For instance, in a four-minute video, dawlaty presented the constitutions 
that Syria adopted since 1920. 300  Other videos emphasised the importance of tolerance and 
citizenship rights.301 
Conclusion 
Regardless of their vulnerability and varying degree of power they hold, secular political 
entrepreneurs from the old guard and the new guard play important roles in reconstructing Syrian 
national identity by using a top-down approach. Indeed, all these case studies discussed in this 
chapter provide the bases for the analysis of the utilisation of material structures (such as media 
and charitable networks) and symbolic elements (such as the emphasising of national terminology) 
in striving to reproduce national identity. However, the insecurity crisis interferes with these actors 
and factors and hinders the quest to create a Syrian national identity.  
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2. The bottom-up approach; reconstructing Syrianism from below?: 
Slogans like ‘Syrian people are one’302 and ‘Syrians represent one hand’, were chanted during the 
first anti-Assad protest in March 15th 2011 in Damascus, and were widely repeated during the early 
months of the uprising. These slogans bolstered Syrianist sentiment and promotes a national 
identity that included the divergent identity groups. Although about twenty-four months after the 
uprising, the popularity of such slogans decreased, as a result of vehement ethnic polarisation. 
Nevertheless, myriad slogans and songs that promoted national unity were still in effect at the 
grassroots level. Examples of such slogans are: ‘[it is] a revolution against the Ba’athists by Sunnis, 
Shiites and Alawites’, ‘[we are] Sunnis and Alawites, and we want a civil state’, ‘Syria needs 
freedom, for Muslims, Christian, Druze and for Alawites’. A final example addressed the Alawites 
directly, saying; ‘Oh you Alawite, do not hesitate, we are your family and not Bashar [Assad]’.303 
These slogans were voiced during anti-Assad protests in cities like Damascus, Homs and Aleppo, 
and also in lesser towns like Yabroud of Damascus and Kafrnubl of Idlib. Importantly, in many 
cases, these slogans incited confrontation between radical and liberal protesters. A good indicator 
of this, is the clashes that took place during a protest on February 8th 2013 in Sarqib province, 
southern Idlib, where dozens of secular youth, (some of them were affiliated with nabed), chanted 
‘unity, freedom, civil state’ while waving the revolutionary flag. This provoked fundamentalists 
to punish those civil youths, and to chant loudly: ‘we want an Islamic Caliphate’ while waving a 
Salafi-Jihadi flag.304 Certainly, such incidents reflected the on ongoing identity clashes, while at 
the same time embodying the attempts to reproduce Syrian national identity at the grassroots level 
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and to emphasise the role of symbols in the war of identities. Furthermore, it denotes the social 
interaction between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches, which seem to subject identity 
to an enduring process of reproduction.   
Viewed in this light, songs that projected national sentiment came to occupy a key place in anti-
Assad protests, and were also broadly distributed throughout the online community. In essence, 
these songs emphasised nationalist phraseology, such as ‘motherland’, ‘Syria’, and ‘Syrian 
people’. An extremely popular song that was repeated throughout the first two years of the uprising 
condemns sectarian divisions among the Syrians. This song was entitled: ‘and I am going to protest 
while carrying my blood in my hands’. This song was created in May 2011 by protesters in the 
dyr-b’alba suburb of Homs, -which (as chapter two discussed) was a hotbed for the occurrence of 
sectarian incidents, as it borders Alawite districts-. An extract of the song runs as follows: 
“And I’m going to protest while I’m carrying my blood in my hands, oh mother do not cry if I 
come back to you as a martyr. These youths have heard about the Syrian revolution and started to 
chant for freedom. Oh Bashar [Assad] we are neither terrorists nor Salafis. We are the sons of this 
county, [we are] the sons of you, Syria. The crisis won’t divide us, [we are] Sunnis and 
Alawites”.305 
Another example of a song that stressed the importance of national unity is entitled: ‘will build 
Syria, a civil state’. It signifies the quest to reproduce a civic national identity and to develop 
harmony amongst Syrians. Interestingly, the song was created on March 2013, by civil youths in 
Aleppo aiming to counter an earlier version of a Salafi-Jihadi song (Shurta Nusairiyya, mentioned 
in section 2 of chapter 3) that threatened to slaughter the Alawites. The new version of the song 
mimics the melody of the old version but alters its lyrics radically. A brief extract of it says: 
“We will build Syria, a civil state. The Syrian people revolted because they want freedom. Justice 
is our demand, neither hatred nor revenge. Despite the pain and the blood, we will remain brothers 
and Syria will gather us. Syria is about its colours, it is rich because of you and because of us. [So] 
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do not allow the test of the blood to blind your belief”.306 This song was extensively distributed 
throughout the online realm, and was sung in a few protests in Damascus and Aleppo. However, 
by March 2013, the number of anti-Assad protests had shrunk due to the escalation of violence. 
In the same context, in December 2011 (when sectarian clashes were inflamed in Homs, due to 
polarisation and kidnapping incidents), a group of secular youths created an apolitical song that 
denounced sectarianism and called for tolerance among Syrians: 
“I want to tell a story about love and hope, a story about my country and its dreadful pain. I do not 
understand politics, but I’m following the news, regardless of everything that has happened, in 
Syria we are all brothers. I’m going to Homs within the next two days […]. I’m going to see my 
brothers; the loyalist, the opponent, the protester and the security officer […] the radical and the 
secular […]. I’m going to meet the big family whose children grew up together […]. I will go to 
my school in Bab-Siba’a, in which I learned that each girl is my sister and each boy is my brother, 
in which religious classes [we used to have as students] in the previous years could not convince 
us that we are different […]. This is the story of my family that needs a minute of quiet to listen to 
its heart which beats the same blood. I’m going to Homs castle to write graffiti that says ‘we are 
one people, a united nation and we will cut off the hand that played with sectarianism’ 
[…]”.307Although the song was not commonly sung in protests on account of its length and slow 
melody, it was posted widely online and was acknowledged by a wide range of Syrians, even those 
loyal to Assad. 
A final example is a song entitled ‘the lily vendor’, which reinforced the concept of Syrian 
nationalism. The lyrics of this song were written by Adnan al-Awda, a civil activist based in 
Damascus. In March 2013, this song spread throughout the online community, and received over 
63,400 view on YouTube. Most importantly, it was appreciated by various groups of Syrians, both 
rebels and pro-Assad Syrians. A brief extract of the song runs: 
                                                          
306 For an online version of this song see “shurta nusairiyya, al-niskha al-halabiyya” , (‘Nusairiyya  policemen, the 
Aleppo version’), YouTube, accessed on 15/4/2013, available at  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxXHvkkoZgM  
307  For an online version of this song see “nazil ‘ala homs” (‘[ I’m] going to Homs’), YouTube, accessed on 





“The lily vendor in al-mayissat square (a central square in Damascus), has sold five bouquets […]. 
One was for the widow of a martyr and one was for a mother [...]. The last one was for a killer, 
who wanted to hide the blood of [his] victim before it would drip […]. The lily vendor sold all the 
bouquets and [then she] went back to the plantation to get [more] seeds, [We are all] Syrians”.308  
Indeed, such national symbols, songs, and slogans indicate that a sense of Syrianism is functioning 
on a bottom-up approach, and is interacting with those discourses directed from above. This 
interaction seems to position Syrian national identity on an enduring process of reproduction. 
 
Conclusion 
Amidst the war of identities that exploded during the uprising, Syrian national identity was 
reproduced from above and from below.  The secular old guard and the new guard constitute the 
key political entrepreneurs, who strove to generate a sense of Syrian nationalism and to induce a 
civic national identity in which the individual’s affiliation with the Syrian state would be the 
dominant layer. Both of these actors employed material structures (mainly, the media) and also 
symbolic features (such as the evocation of Syria’s history) to reproduce a national identity that 
would assert their power over other actors. However, myriad vulnerabilities imposed limitations 
on their chances to do so in the short-term. On the one hand, the old guard represented a deeply 
fragmented actor who lacked legitimacy, clear programs and objectives, social base, and most 
importantly, powerful material resources. Although they had a long record of political struggle 
against the Assad regime, the old guard could not develop appropriate strategies that would meet 
the public demands, and suit the new context created by the Arab Spring. In addition, the old guard 
could not bridge the generation gap between themselves and the new guard, and hence they were 
unable to attract a vital component in the uprising.  These intellectual secularists also failed to 
enlist the support of the pious Syrians of rural areas. More importantly, they were subjected to the 
regime’s divide-and- rule politics, which transformed them in the popular imagination from being 
an old enemy of the regime, to a trustful actor that the regime would be ready to negotiate with. 
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This, destroyed the legitimacy and credibility that they had hitherto enjoyed as an anti-regime bloc.   
On the other hand, the new guard who were born during the eighties and early nineties, adhered to 
Syrian nationalism and associated themselves less with the ideology of Arabism than their parents’ 
generation. 309  Moreover, as secularists, they veered away from Islamic fundamentalism. 
Therefore, they established themselves collectively as a political player who sought to unite the 
Syrians in a cohesive sense of national identity. Chiefly, these young people represented the 
bedrock of the peaceful mass movements, and were extremely active on the ground. Unlike the 
old guard this yielded them credibility in the eyes of many Syrians. However, the new guard 
seemed to have been trapped between the continuous repression of the regime and the challenges 
put to them by fundamentalists, which provoked them to flee the country, and handicapped their 
agenda. Beside this, like the old guard, they lacked sufficient material sources for advancing their 
aims. Although they succeeded in utilising material structures, one could nevertheless argue that 
such materials were not accessible to a large category of Syrians, in that only those who had 
internet access could listen to radio stations, and only those who were educated could read their 
bulletins. Hence, the efficiency of their communication tools was restricted. In this respect, the 
secular ideology adopted by both of the old guard and the new guard created a division between 
themselves and the devout lower-classes from the rural areas, a class that inclines itself more 
readily towards radicalisation. Therefore, the attempts of both the old guard and the new guard to 
reproduce Syrian national identity was limited to a particular class of Syrians, namely, the 
educated, urban middle-classes of secular beliefs. Nonetheless, the new guard proved themselves 
capable to a relative extent of bridging these gaps, owing to the fact that, many of the new guard 
originally came from rural areas. With the onset of the uprising they returned to their towns and 
villages, from where they established networks that strove to advance Syrian nationalism and to 
counter the unfolding sectarian discourse. More importantly, these networks developed links 
between rural and urban areas. However, the obstacles presented by the regime’s campaign of 
suppression, the predominance of the fundamentalists in the rural areas, and the general lack of 
funds served to thwart any chances of real progress.   Overlapping these attempts by the old guard 
and the new guard to reproduce national identity from above, is the discourse that was projected 
                                                          
309 The new guard mainly stressed the individual’s association with the territorial Syrian state (for example, by 
frequently displaying the Syrian map), and sought to impress upon Syrians that they were citizens of a Syrian nation 
by evoking Syrian history and culture. However, this is not to say that the new guard devalued the ideology of 





at the grassroots level, and which embodied a sense of Syrian nationalism. Various cross-sectarian 
songs and slogans emerged during the uprising, which played a crucial role in reproducing national 
identity from below, as they sought to craft an inclusive identity for all identity groups. 
In summary, the ongoing uprising in Syria subjects the Syrian national identity to a continuous 
process of reproduction. As this chapter has demonstrated, four variables (political entrepreneurs, 
material structure, symbolic elements and the security dilemma) are the core pillars of this process. 
Importantly, these variables interact with other from a top-down as well as a bottom-up 
perspective, and provide ground for including and excluding members of a group. Indeed, a sense 
of Syrianism appears to being projected from below and interacts with discourses of secular actors 
projected from above. In turn, these actors manipulate material structures and symbolic elements 
in order to craft a national identity that bolsters the individual’s affiliation with the Syrian state 
and transcends sectarian belongings. Nevertheless, these actors have been made vulnerable by the 
security dilemma that underpinned the uprising. In the short-term, this has thwarted their quest to 




















This thesis had provided insights into several of the existing debates about identity, nationalism 
and conflict.  The thesis argued that identity was used as an essential weapon with which to 
construct power among the various identity groups, and it has attempted to demonstrated that a 
war waged with identities can be as significant and powerful as one waged with bullets. Indeed, 
the Syrian case reveals that there is no single inevitable identity; several identities can either co-
exist or clash. The coexistence or clashing between identities depends on both materialistic and 
symbolic elements, and is subject to discourse directed from a top-down as well as a bottom-up 
mobilisation of symbols. The interaction between both levels and between the materialistic and 
symbolic features alters the balance of identity, either stabilising or destroying it. As has been 
argued in chapter one of this thesis, identity entails a group of affiliations that an individual has 
with a place, state religion, tribe or clan. It cannot be limited to one given affiliation, rather, it is 
composed of myriad layers. None of these layers are capable of completely eroding or effacing 
one another, however, one given layer may prevail over the others, which alters the identity balance 
and provokes identity clashes. In essence, the foregoing chapters have attempted to prove that the 
interaction between materialistic and symbolic elements and between discourses directed from 
above and those directed from below, subjects identity to a continuous process of reproduction, 
which triggers identity clashes. This interaction is devalued by modernist who prioritise material 
conditions, and by ethno-symbolists who prioritise symbolic discourse. Hence, the theoretical 
model proposed in chapter one emphasises the significance of this interaction in reproducing 
identity and provoking identity clashes. According to this model, four variables are critical to this 
process; state and non-state political entrepreneurs, material structure, symbolic elements, and the 
presence of a security dilemma.  The interaction between these variables reconstructs the power of 
a particular identity and subjects it to a continuous process of reproduction.  
Fundamentally, the empirical chapters of this thesis attempt to demonstrate that the discourses of 





Qatar, Turkey, the KRG, Sunni political entrepreneurs, Kurdish players and the old and new guard 
of Syria’s secular opposition) aim to reproduce different identities for realpolitik gains, and are 
capable of constructing identity clashes. Although these actors differ in the style in which they 
project their discourses, some of them project sectarian discourses in an explicit way (such as the 
Sunni political entrepreneurs who use anti-Alawite language), while the discourses of other actors 
(like the Syrian regime, Iran and Hezbollah) are implicitly sectarian. Nevertheless, both discourses 
seem to provoke a sectarian response from listeners, and therefore emphasise the conflicts between 
the different identity groups from above. The second variable suggested by this thesis to be 
responsible for reconstructing identities and fueling identity clashes is the material structure. 
Indeed, the findings of this thesis indicate that material structures and resources (such as arms, 
media and charitable networks) were manipulated by the various political entrepreneurs, and 
played a vital role in pitting particular identities against others. The manipulation of these variables 
played a vital role in inciting identity clashes. Therefore, this thesis supports the claim of 
modernists that the policies of the elite, when implemented in conjunction with material variables, 
serve to reconstruct identities. However, this thesis has argued that, in contrast to the modernists’ 
assumptions, the manipulation of material structures is not capable of reproducing identities 
independently. Rather, this reproduction depends upon another variable: the symbols of each 
identity group. As ethno-symbolists claim, it is the symbolic elements that motivate communal 
actions and pit identity groups against each other. In this light, chapters 3, 4 and 5 revealed how 
slogans, flags, folklore, jokes, language and myths (such as the Zulfiqar sword, the citing from Ibn 
Taimiyya, the Kurdish language, the Newroz celebration and the Syrian map) signify how an 
individual is different from the ‘other’, and emphasise the concept of ‘otherness’ by visibly 
excluding or including members of a specific identity group. Thus, these elements play significant 
roles in reproducing identity and ‘renewing the ancient hatred’310 between identity groups. This 
consequently serves to provoke the outbreak of identity clashes. Nevertheless, although the elite 
manipulated symbolic elements by using a top-down approach, chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis 
argue that symbolic elements also function at the grassroots level and are not subject to the 
manipulation of the elite. Therefore, the interaction between symbolic and material elements from 
a bottom-up and top-down perspective -an interaction that is devalued by symbolists and 
modernists- is crucial to reconstructing identity and inciting identity clashes. However, the 
                                                          





empirical chapters of this thesis discuss how, unlike symbols, material resources (such as media, 
arms, and money) are not equally distributed, and actors with superior material resources (such as 
the PYD and the NF) have a greater chance of winning the war of identities. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of material resources might change (for instance, the Sufis or the KNC might secure 
material structures), which is likely to alter the balance of power between all actors and to redress 
the balance between identities.  
The last variable proposed in the theoretical model is the insecurity crisis, which result from the 
breakdown of order in civil war. This crisis plays a crucial role in inciting identity clashes between 
the various identity groups. Since each identity group fears the other’s domination, all of them 
have become locked in a vicious circle of mistrust, and have had to fight for survival. Furthermore, 
chaos, poverty, violence and propaganda have served to exacerbate this security dilemma.  Hence, 
as the analytical model used in this study suggests, the interplay between all these variables: state 
and non-state political entrepreneurs, material structures, symbolic elements and the security 
dilemma, creates enmity between the different identity groups, which lead to identity clashes. In 
fact, this interaction between political entrepreneurs, material structure, symbolic elements and the 
security dilemma determines the boundaries between identity groups and subjects the Alawite, 
Sunni, Kurdish and Syrian national identities to an enduring process of reproduction. In other 
words, the interplay between the top-down and the bottom up approach (which constitutes the 
analytical focal point of this study) is capable of including and excluding members of a group, as 
well as redressing the balance between different identities and inciting clashes. Are any of these 
identity groups capable of single handedly winning this war by establishing the hegemony of a 
particular identity? Would a material balance of power and a power sharing between groups pave 
the way for tolerance of identity diversity? Or will the current identity clashes be suppressed by 
one materially victorious actor? If none is able to prevail over the other, will the outcome a 
reconfiguration of territorial borders come to reflect mutual exclusive identity groups? These 
questions are yet to be answered.  
In my last visit to Syria in August and September 2013, the uprising was in its 30th month; anarchy 
was widespread, and violent conflict had extended to the use of chemical weapons. Humanitarian 
and socio-economic erosion was spreading all over the country. By then, Syria had clearly 





international actors. Sectarian hatred and sectarian violence were rapidly increasing with the 
escalation of the conflict, and this reflected the acceleration of the sectarian discourses projected 
by various political entrepreneurs.  Syria’s future looked very bleak. 
I managed to ask representatives of each identity group about their motivations for continuing to 
fight. The question I put to them was: ‘what are you fighting for?. Paradoxically, all of them had 
the same answer that they were fighting for Syria, for al-watan (‘the motherland’). However, each 
of them had his own perspective of al-watan, which did not include the ‘other’. The Alawite 
representative, wanted an ‘Assad’s Syria’. The Sunni representative wanted an Islamist Syria. The 
Kurdish representative was referring to Kurdistan of Syria. Mohamed, a 23 year-old member of 
the secular new guard -who had recently been arrested by the Syrian regime-, said: “we are all 
fighting for Syria. But I’m struggling to find something that would unite all of us”.311 In fact, for 
as long as they remained within the identity box, Syrians from the various identity groups were 
trapped on a sinking ship. Here it worth re-calling the words of the Syrian philosopher abou al-
‘ala’ al-ma’arri (d. 1058), who said: inama hazihi al-mazahib ‘assbab li jalb al-dunia ‘ila al-
rou’as’a “these sects are only reasons for bringing about life for leaders”.312 It is easy to discern 
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16 May 1916               Sykes Picot agreement by which Syria as a territorial state was created and 
granted to the French mandate. 
 
17 April 1946               Syria’s independence. 
 
October 1962               Special census in Kurdish areas. 
 
8 March 1963               Ba’ath military coup. 
 
12 March 1971             Hafiz Assad assumed presidency. 
 
 2-28 February 1982     The Syrian regime military campaign against Muslim Brotherhood in 
Hama.  
 
10 June 2000                 Death of Hafez Assad. 
 






June 2000 - 2001           Damascus Spring. 
 
2002                              Elimination of Damascus Spring. 
 
March 2004                  Arab/Kurdish clashes in Northeast Syria. 
 
October 2005                Damascus Declaration. 
December 2005             Elimination of Damascus Declaration. 
 
December 2010             uprising in Tunisia. 
 
January 2011                 uprisings in Egypt and in Yemen. 
 
February 2011               uprising in Libya. 
 
March 2011                   uprising in Syria. 
 
April 2011                    security solution was employed by the Syrian regime. 
 






July 2011                         Creation of Free Syrian Army (FSA). 
 
February 2012                 military solution applied by the Syrian regime. 
 
























BSSC            Building the Syrian State Current. 
CCDC           Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. 
DD                Damascus Declaration. 
FSA               Free Syrian Army. 
KDP              Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
KRG              Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. 
NF                 Nusra Front. 
PCWK           People’s Council of Western Kurdistan. 
PKK               Kurdistan Worker’s party (‘Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan’ in Kurdish). 
KNC              Kurdish National Council. 
PYD               Democratic Union Party (‘Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat’ in Kurdish). 
UKYC            Union of Kurdish Youth Committees in Syria. 












Note on transliteration: 
This thesis followed the transliteration system provided by the International Journal of Middle East 

































Syrian Qubayssiyyat shop for religious gifts ahead of Prophet Muhammad's birthday, in 
Damascus, 24/2/ 2010. 












A young Syrian girl holds the holy Quran and wears a fake dynamite belt as she acts as a suicide 
bomber, during an anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstration in Damascus, March 26, 2010. 









Anti-Assad protesters chant slogans in front of a mosque in Kafrsuseh area in Damascus, 
27/02/2012. 













Assad troops are besieging a protest that was taking place in a mosque yard in Kafrsuseh area in 
Damascus, 27/2/2012.  













Zulfiqar sword imprinted with picturer of Imam Ali. The writing  in Arabic reads: ‘there is no 
guy but Ali, and there is no sword but Zulfiqar’. 












A street vendor displays necklaces that symbolise Alawite, Druze and Syrian national identities, 
in central Damascus, 16/09/2013. From bottom right to left: Picture of Imam Ali, Hassan 
Nassrallah, Bashar Assad, miniature Zulfiqar Sword, map of Syria in the colours of Syrian flag. 
From top right to left: Zulfiqar sword with colours of the Syrian flag and imprinted with picture of 
Bashar Assad, Palestinian map in the colors of the Palestinian flag, and the Druze star (an important 
symbol of Druze identity group). 











Anti-Aassad protesters wave the revolutioanry and the Salafi flags during a protest in the subrubs 
of Damascus, 26/05/2012. 












The profile picture of UKYC’s Facebook page. It shows the Syrian map surrounded by the 
revolutionary flag and the Kurdish flag, while in the middle writing in Arabic and in Kurdish 
reads:  ‘Syria is for all Syrians’. 















Hafiz Assad statue (right), the slogan inscribed beneath the picture reads: ‘Syrian production’, 
statue of Saddam Hussein (left), the slogan inscribed beneath the picture reads: ‘American 
production’. 















A graffiti by dawlaty that was presented in al-Raqa. It reads: ‘Syria is civil and free’. 



















A graffiti by dawlaty that was presented in the Attareb suburb of Aleppo, it reads: ‘Syria is for 
me, for you and for all’. 

















A graffiti by dawlaty that was presented in the Attareb suburb of Aleppo, it reads: ‘Syria is a 
mother for all its children’. 
Source: “Syria is a mother for all its children”, dawlaty website, accessed on 8/10/2013, 












An anti-Assad activist of the new guard is spraying a wall with Arabic graffiti that reads: ‘the 
Syrian people are on’, 30/4/2012,  in Kafrsuseh area in Damascus.  
Source: by Ola Rifai. 
 
 
 
